Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner  Best Interests  Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports by Pollack, Jason M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 67 Issue 4 Article 9 
1999 
Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests" 
Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports 
Jason M. Pollack 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests" Disciplinary Authority in 
Professional Sports, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1645 (1999). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests" Disciplinary Authority 
in Professional Sports 
Cover Page Footnote 
I dedicate this Note to Mom and Momma, for their love, support, and Chicken Marsala. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/9 
TAKE MY ARBITRATOR, PLEASE: COMMISSIONER "BEST
INTERESTS" DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Jason M. Pollack*
"[I]f participants and spectators alike cannot assume integrity and
fairness, and proceed from there, the contest cannot in its essence
exist."
A. Bartlett Giamatti - 19871
INTRODUCTION
During the first World War, the United States government closed
the nation's horsetracks, prompting gamblers to turn their attention to
baseball, then America's biggest form of entertainment.2 In an epi-
sode popularly known today as the "Black Sox scandal,"'3 eight Chi-
cago White Sox players fixed the outcome of the 1919 World Series,
causing the White Sox to lose to the Cincinnati Reds, five games to
three.' Gamblers and a group of crooked players had tarnished a
sport which, up to that time, had prided itself on its integrity and
wholesomeness.' Many believed baseball's lack of a single authority
figure to enforce its laws made it possible for the scandal to occur.6
* I dedicate this Note to Mom and Momma, for their love, support, and Chicken
Marsala.
1. A Great and Glorious Game: Baseball Writings of A. Bartlett Giamatti 73
(Kenneth S. Robson ed., 1998) [hereinafter Giamatti].
2. See George F. Will, Bunts: Curt Flood, Camden Yards, Pete Rose and Other
Reflections on Baseball 113 (1998).
3. For an account of the events surrounding the 1919 World Series, see Eliot
Asinof, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series (1963).
4. See Jerome Holtzman, The Commissioners: Baseball's Midlife Crisis 29
(1998).
5. See G. Edward White, Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms
Itself 1903-1953, at 85 (1996) ("Put starkly, the first generation of twentieth-century
[baseball] owner-builders was interested in establishing their sport as the personifica-
tion of middle-class values, which, at the time, were synonymous with morality, re-
spectability, and civic-mindedness.").
Team owners were not the only ones concerned and obsessed with baseball's integ-
rity. The general public also looked to baseball as a source of character and virtue, an
"institution occupying a niche just below belief in God and respect for motherhood."
Harold Seymour, Baseball: The Golden Age 274 (1971) ("Americans might tolerate
corruption in government and business and indeed take a certain amount of it for
granted, but baseball to them occupied a loftier sphere."). Even President William
Howard Taft noted the sport's integrity, observing that "[t]he game of base ball [sic]
... is a clean, straight game, and it summons to its presence everybody who enjoys
clean, straight athletics." Id.
6. See Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law: Cases, Materials
and Problems 9 (1993) [hereinafter Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law]; see also
John Helyar, Lords of the Realm: The Real History of Baseball 8 (1994) ("The worst
part [of the Black Sox scandal] was that baseball had no leader to restore its good
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The scandal, raising "serious doubts about baseball being on the
level," sparked a need for professional baseball to restore its integ-
rity.7 To accomplish this task, in 1920 the American and National
Leagues named Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, a federal district
court judge from Chicago, as the first commissioner of Major League
Baseball ("MLB").8
The owners in MLB granted Commissioner Landis broad powers to
police the game of baseball.9 Commissioner Landis "had agreed to
accept the position upon the clear understanding that the owners had
sought 'an authority ... outside of [their] own business, and that a
part of that authority would be a control over whatever and whoever
had to do with baseball.""'  Under the Major League Agreement
("MLA"), baseball's governing document, the commissioner could
"investigate, either upon complaint or upon his own initiative, any act,
transaction or practice charged, alleged or suspected to be detrimental
to the best interests of the national game of base ball [sic] ... [and]
determine, after investigation, what preventive, remedial or punitive
action is appropriate .... "I'
As the Black Sox scandal made clear, if professional sports are to
maintain their revered status in American society, the public must
have confidence that the contests it sees are genuine and real. In
other words, the public must believe that, in any given contest, the
players are putting forth maximum effort to achieve victory. If exter-
nal factors such as drug use or gambling impinge on this effort, then
interest in professional sports would vanish, as the public would doubt
that both teams in a game are trying their best and playing under the
name."); Richard S. Simons, Indiana's Baseball Magnates: When the Major Leagues
Needed Strong Guidance They Turned to Three Hoosiers, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 9,
1977 (Magazine), at 9 ("The game needed an incorruptible Rock of Gibraltar who
would purify it and mete out punishment with a firm hand.").
7. Helyar, supra note 6, at 8; see also David Quentin Voigt, American Baseball
Volume II: From the Commissioners to Continental Expansion 138 (1970) ("[Tjhe
[Black Sox] scandal struck at the very foundation of baseball, threatening the annihi-
lation of the old pattern of order and offering no replacement.").
In 1920, the need for an authority figure to restore integrity in professional baseball
became more apparent as America faced many global challenges to its value system.
See James Kirby, The Year They Fixed the World Series, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1988, at 65, 67.
Although the United States emerged victorious from World War I, the threats of Bol-
shevism, increased foreign entanglements through the League of Nations, and an un-
settled Europe placed fear in Americans that they "were losing the peace." Id. "Now
baseball, that great American institution which represented our finest traditional val-
ues, was revealed to be corrupt, done in by... criminals who had masterminded and
bankrolled the plot. If baseball was no good, what hope was there for the rest of our
culture and society?" Id.
8. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 22-23.
9. See id. at 22.
10. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1978).
11. Major League Agreement § 2(a)-(b), at 1 (1921).
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same rules.12 Thus, to maintain their legitimacy and the public's faith,
professional sports leagues must eliminate any act that strikes at a
sport's integrity. 3 Today, the commissioners of MLB, the National
Football League ("NFL"), and the National Basketball Association
("NBA")1 4 maintain broad powers to protect the "integrity of, and
public confidence in," their respective sports, and thus determine the
"best interests" of their leagues.'"
The power of a commissioner to determine and police the best in-
terests of an industry is unique in American society.' 6 The owners of
athletic teams not only bankroll their teams, but also collectively own
the league itself. 7 Those owners then voluntarily appoint an individ-
ual, who has no authority or power separate from the league, to deter-
12. See Giamatti, supra note 1, at 72-73 (stating that acts which damage the integ-
rity of a sport "strike at and seek to undermine the basic foundation of any contest
declaring the winner-that all participants play under identical rules and conditions").
13. See id. at 73 ("Cheating is contrary to the whole purpose of playing to deter-
mine a winner fairly and cannot be simply contained; if the game is to flourish and
engage public confidence, cheating must be clearly condemned with an eye to expung-
ing it."). See generally Will, supra note 2, at 105 ("Competition can be elevating for
participants and spectators. Thus the integrity of sport is a civic concern.").
14. The commissioner's office of the National Hockey League, due to its recent
creation, is not part of this study. The NHL named Gary Bettman, the former Gen-
eral Counsel and Vice President of the NBA, the league's first commissioner in De-
cember 1992. See Lacy J. Banks, NHL Hopes to Emulate NBA with Bettman, Chi.
Sun-Times, Dec. 13, 1992, at 19.
15. Basic Agreement between the American Leagues of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League
Baseball Players Association art. XI(A)(1)(b), at 29 (1997) [hereinafter MLB Basic
Agreement] (recognizing the commissioner's authority to take action involving "the
preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game
of baseball"); NFL Constitution and Bylaws § 8.13(a), at 19 (1988) (granting the com-
missioner the authority to punish any party "guilty of conduct detrimental to the wel-
fare of the League or professional football"). The NBA Constitution is not available
for public release.
To stress the power of the commissioners' "best interests" authority, noted baseball
historian and political analyst George Will compared the "best interests" clause of
baseball's constitution to the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United
States Constitution. See Will, supra note 2, at 137. "A willful judge can do almost
anything in the name of [these] clauses if he is indifferent to the damage done to the
texture of the law and the stature of his office." Id.
16. See Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 1 ("One of the
unique features of sports as a social, economic, and legal institution is the office of
commissioner of the league."); see also David Harris, The League: The Rise and De-
cline of the NFL 647 (1986) ("The commissioner's job, of course, is very unique ....
You are hired by the owners, but you are called upon to make decisions that affect
them. You can't please everyone, every time.... You simply have to do what you
think in your judgment is in the best interest of the game." (quoting Pete Rozelle, the
second commissioner of the NFL)); Seymour, supra note 5, at 323 ("In creating a
Commissioner to rule over them, the owners [in MLB] established the first 'industry
doctor' in America.").
17. With few exceptions, sports teams are privately owned. These sports teams
belong to a "private, voluntary association" and are bound by a contract "that sets
forth the rules that govern that association." Roger I. Abrams, Legal Bases: Baseball
and the Law 95 (1998).
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mine what is best for their teams and their sport. The Seventh Circuit
has described management of sports leagues through a commissioner
as "an exception, anomaly and aberration."18 The central reason for
the existence of the commissioner's office in professional sports re-
mains the same today as in the days of Judge Landis: to protect the
integrity and best interests of sports leagues.19
Commissioners often use their "best interests" powers to discipline
athletes or other personnel within the league.2" Employee discipline,
however, is a term and condition of employment and, thus, according
to a basic tenet of federal labor law, a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.2 ' The present collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs")
of the NBA and MLB allow for an individual disciplined by the com-
missioner to appeal his punishment to an outside arbitrator. 22 Con-
vinced that commissioners are biased representatives of management,
the National Basketball Players Association ("NBPA") and the Major
League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA") believe that outside
arbitration concerning disciplinary actions best protects players'
rights.2' The NFL's CBA, by contrast, does not permit an outside ar-
bitrator to review commissioner-imposed discipline.24 In the NFL, a
18. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 1978) ("In no other.., business is
there quite the same system, created for quite the same reasons and with quite the
same underlying policies.").
19. See Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 1.
20. Most recently, Commissioner David Stern of the NBA suspended Latrell
Sprewell, a member of the Golden State Warriors, for one year from the NBA for
allegedly attacking his head coach, Peter J. Carlesimo, during a practice session in
December 1997. See National Basketball Players Ass'n & Warriors Basketball Club &
NBA, Opinion and Award 11-12 (1998) (Feerick, Arb.) [hereinafter Sprewell Arbitra-
tion]. Commissioner Stern believed that the discipline of Mr. Sprewell "went to the
preservation of the integrity of the game and maintenance of public confidence." Id.
at 70.
21. See NLRB v. Independent Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1979) ("A
grievance-arbitration procedure is a term or condition of employment and a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of [the National Labor Relations
Act].").
22. See MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 15, at 32-33; NBA Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement art. XXXI, § l(b), at 163 (1995) [hereinafter NBA CBA]. Both
league's CBAs allow their commissioners to remove a disciplinary grievance involving
the game's integrity from the arbitral process. MLB and NBA commissioners, how-
ever, have been slow to utilize this power in fear that removing a grievance would
exacerbate labor relations. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
23. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 37 ("The union regards the commissioner as an
extension [and servant] of the multiemployer bargaining unit .... There will come a
time when there comes an issue that's so compelling for the players' side that... [i]f
[the commissioner] sides with the clubs, it may look patently unfair." (quoting John
Gaherin, MLB management negotiator)). See generally Jeffrey A. Durney, Comment,
Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League Baseball's Disciplinary Process,
41 Emory L.J. 581, 582 (1992) ("[T]here is some question about the propriety of one
man ... wielding unrestricted power over parties forced to submit to his jurisdiction
without recourse to the courts [or arbitration].").
24. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XI, § 1(c), at 29 (1993) [herein-
after NFL CBA].
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player subject to commissioner discipline may appeal only to the com-
missioner, whose decision is final and unappealable. 5
This Note examines the "tribunal" split concerning deference to
commissioner best interests disciplinary decisions in professional
sports. Recent decisions by arbitrators within the NBA and MLB
have displayed very little deference to commissioner discipline im-
posed under the "best interests" clauses within each league's operat-
ing agreement. On the other hand, judges have frequently upheld a
commissioner's right to determine the extent and severity of discipline
regarding private league matters as long as those decisions are not
arbitrary and capricious.26 This Note argues that to protect the best
interests of professional basketball and baseball, the MLB, the NBA,
and their respective unions should follow the NFL's lead and collec-
tively bargain to permit their commissioners to be the sole arbiters of
disciplinary disputes.
Part I of this Note discusses the creation and development of the
commissioner's office in professional sports and examines various
"best interests" decisions made throughout that development. Part II
analyzes the two most recent federal court decisions regarding com-
missioner disciplinary authority, which helped establish and reinforce
the judicial deference given to commissioners. Part III scrutinizes two
arbitration awards from the 1990s that failed to exhibit judicial and
CBA-imposed deference to commissioner disciplinary decisions. Part
IV argues that to properly maintain the integrity of professional base-
ball and basketball, the MLBPA and the NBPA must recognize that
commissioners need non-reviewable authority to make disciplinary
decisions. This argument rests on the proposition that commissioners,
endowed with the responsibility to protect the integrity of professional
sports, are better suited to determine what is best for those sports than
either arbitrators or judges.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
To fully understand the scope of authority that unions should yield
to commissioners, it is necessary to look at the position's genesis and
development, the original power of the office, and the types of actions
commissioners have taken to preserve the integrity of their sports.
Because professional baseball initially created the commissioner's of-
fice, it serves as the primary "vehicle to examine [this] genesis" and
development.27
25. See id.
26. See F'nley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978).
27. Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Profes-
sional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the
Pete Rose Controversy, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1409, 1413 (1990). Two additional reasons exist
to focus primarily on baseball here. First, MLB has had more commissioners and
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A. Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis
Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis's first venture into the world of
professional baseball came in 1915 when the Federal League, an in-
dependent baseball league, brought an antitrust suit against the Na-
tional and American leagues ("Organized Baseball") in the United
States District Court in Northern Illinois. 8 Seeking relief under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 the Federal League charged
Organized Baseball with being a combination in restraint of the inter-
state trade of baseball." Undoubtedly, the Federal League chose
Landis's court because of his reputation as a trustbuster.3 1 The Fed-
eral League did not know, however, that Judge Landis was an avid
baseball fan.32 "Never one to permit judicial impartiality to interfere
with his personal biases and leanings,"33 Judge Landis took the case
under advisement for one year to avoid ruling on the matter, thereby
forcing the two sides to settle.34
During the trial, Judge Landis made every effort to make his feel-
ings clear concerning the Federal League's attack on Organized Base-
ball. He warned the Federal League's attorneys that "a decision in
this case may tear down the very foundations of this game, so loved by
thousands.'35 Judge Landis also informed the parties that "any blows
at the thing called baseball would be regarded by this court as a blow
conflicts than either the NFL or NBA. Second, the history of baseball, much more
than the history of any other sport, has received intense scholarly study.
28. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 212.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
30. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 212.
31. See id. In only his third year on the bench, Judge Landis fined John D. Rocke-
feller's Standard Oil Company $29.24 million for violations of the federal antitrust
laws. See Simons, supra note 6, at 9. Although a higher court reversed his ruling on
appeal, Judge Landis, an appointee of President Theodore Roosevelt, became an "in-
stant folk hero" and a "legend while still a young man." Id.
32. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 212; see also White, supra note 5, at 105-06
("[Landis] was a baseball fan, but he was first and foremost a patriot, an uncompro-
mising moralist who inevitably saw his decisions as contributing to the uplifting of
America's youth, and a man entirely comfortable with exercising power arbitrarily, in
accordance with his intuitions.").
33. Seymour, supra note 5, at 212. Further evidence that Judge Landis ruled ac-
cording to his personal biases can be found in his displays of extreme patriotism dur-
ing and after World War I. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 19. After the war, Judge
Landis issued a summons for Kaiser Wilhelm II for his role in the death of a Chi-
cagoan who died in the 1915 sinking of the Lusitania. See id. Landis also presided
over the trial of socialist Victor Berger, a famous German-Austrian emigrant, who
Landis found guilty of "impeding the war effort." Helyar, supra note 6, at 7.
Although Landis gave Berger the maximum punishment, he later remarked: "It was
my great disappointment to give Berger only twenty years in Leavenworth. I believe
the law should have enabled me to have had him lined up against a wall and shot." Id.
34. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 20-21. Landis knew very well that the Federal
League could not obtain favorable settlement terms from Organized Baseball. The
Federal League folded after receiving a $600,000 indemnity in settlement from Organ-
ized Baseball. See Simons, supra note 6, at 9.
35. Seymour, supra note 5, at 212.
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at a national institution."3 6 When it came time for them to name their
first commissioner, the owners within Organized Baseball forgot
neither Judge Landis nor his assistance during the Federal League
suit.3
7
After approaching Judge Landis concerning the position of commis-
sioner of professional baseball, the owners began to second-guess the
absolute authority they offered to him. 38 In a last-minute attempt to
retain a "shred of their power," the owners tried to resurrect the pre-
commissioner system, where the two league presidents would sit side-
by-side with Landis and jointly govern baseball. 39 Threatening to re-
ject the position if the owners insisted on adhering to the old system,
Landis reminded them that they "had calmly and thoroughly gone
into [their] troubles and had a structure outlined which provided for
an authority to discharge a responsibility and that part of that author-
ity would be control over whatever and whoever had to do with base-
ball."'4 The owners quickly capitulated and signed the original
agreement proposed to Landis, endowing him with the unqualified,
unilateral authority to act in the best interests of baseball."1
In addition to granting Landis absolute authority within baseball
governance, the owners submitted to a "Pledge of Loyalty," promising
to adhere to the commissioner's rulings by forfeiting the right to ap-
peal a Landis decision in court. The pledge read as follows:
We, the undersigned, earnestly desirous of insuring to the public
wholesome and high class baseball, and believing that we ourselves
should set for the players an example of the sportsmanship which
accepts the umpires' decisions without complaint, hereby pledge
loyally to support the Commissioner in his important and difficult
task; and we assure him that each of us will acquiesce in his decisions
even when we believe them mistaken, and that we will not discredit
the sport by public criticisms of him or one another.4 2
With these words, and with the authority granted to him by the Major
League Agreement, Commissioner Landis began to shape the powers
of an office never held before in any sport.
As commissioner, Landis planned to "clean out the crookedness
and the gambling responsible for it and keep the sport above re-
proach."43 Landis believed that, as the leader of America's national
pastime, he was "discharging a public trust [and] that he was repre-
36. Simons, supra note 6, at 9.
37. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 21.
38. See id at 25.
39. See id.
40. Id at 26 (quoting Judge Landis).
41. See id. at 28.
42. Id at 22 (emphasis added).
43. White, supra note 5, at 110.
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senting the baseball lovers of America."44 To maintain the sport's in-
tegrity, Landis planned on eliminating not only evil, but also the
appearance of evil from the game.45 To commence this task and set
the tone for his entire administration and administrations to come,
Commissioner Landis would have to decide the fate of the eight Chi-
cago White Sox who fixed the 1919 World Series.
At first, Landis was slow to act in response to the scandal.46 When
American League President Ban Johnson asked Landis several
months after being named commissioner what he was doing about the
case, Landis replied, "Nothing. '47 With the trial of the eight White
Sox underway, Commissioner Landis seemingly wanted to wait until
the judicial process ran its course before announcing his decision. On
August 2, 1921, after written confessions from three of the Black Sox
had mysteriously disappeared, a jury found the accused not guilty of
"intent to defraud the gambling public."'48 After the judge announced
the verdict, the courtroom erupted, the jurors carried the players
around on their shoulders, and the judge congratulated the jury on its
"fair decision.
49
The celebration, however, was short-lived. The day after the ver-
dict, Commissioner Landis used his best interests powers to impose
lifetime suspensions upon the eight crooked players.5" In his state-
ment, Commissioner Landis declared:
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player that throws a ballgame,
no player that undertakes or promises to throw a ball game, no
player that sits in a conference with a bunch of crooked players and
gamblers where the ways and means of throwing games are planned
and discussed and does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever
play professional baseball .... Just keep in mind that regardless of
the verdict of juries, baseball is entirely competent to protect itself
against the crooks, both inside and outside the game. 5
Beyond his obvious interest in repairing the integrity of professional
baseball, Landis believed this decision was necessary to preserve the
44. Ed Fitzgerald, Judge Landis: The Man Who Saved Baseball, Sport, June 1950,
at 49, 50.
45. See White, supra note 5, at 110 ("[Baseball players] must avoid even the ap-
pearance of evil or feel the iron hand of his power to throw them out of any part of
the game." (quoting Sporting News, Jan. 20, 1921)). See generally Fitzgerald, supra
note 44, at 53 ("In the Landis lexicon, being clean didn't mean just passably neat; it
meant snow white.").
46. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 324.
47. Id.
48. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 31.
49. Seymour, supra note 5, at 329.
50. See Judge Landis Bars "Clean" Sox from Baseball Forever, N.Y. World, Aug. 3,
1921, at 3 ("The verdict 'Not guilty' returned in the trial of the ball players means
nothing to Judge K. M. Landis. To-day [sic] he returned a verdict of his own, ruling
the players off the diamonds of organized baseball forever.").
51. Id.
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spirit of America's youth. After rendering his decision, Landis ex-
plained to a reporter: "Baseball is something more than a game to an
American boy; it is his training field for life work .... Destroy his
faith in its squareness and honesty and you have destroyed something
more; you have planted suspicion of all things in his heart."'
Baseball historians disagree as to the propriety of Landis's behavior
and his decision regarding the Black Sox scandal. Some assert that
Landis acted appropriately to rid the game of its lingering black eye.53
Others have noted that, although Commissioner Landis's punishment
was rough justice, "roughness can make justice effective." s Some
earlier historians, however, criticized Commissioner Landis for the ar-
bitrary nature of his ruling.15 One argued that Landis, by ignoring the
verdict of the jury, "denied [the players] their civil rights by the appli-
cation of baseball regulations."56 Another believed that "[i]n pro-
scribing the players, Landis wielded not a sword of justice but an
extra-legal scythe."5
Despite these differences of opinion, most commentators agree that
Landis's decision helped restore baseball to its rightful place in Amer-
ican society, while also solidifying the power of his office.-, Commis-
sioner Landis was baseball's "new symbol of rectitude. '5 9  He
established his own brand of justice, where he was "the prosecutor,
defense attorney, judge, and jury" and gave notice to wrongdoers that
his decisions would be absolute.' According to one commentator,
Landis's decision "to ban the players, announced on the heels of their
acquittal, underscored the independence of his office and its identifi-
52. Helyar, supra note 6, at 8 (quoting Landis).
53. See Kirby, supra note 7, at 69 ("Landis is widely regarded as a savior-though
not a saint-and as having rendered an approximation of justice for the group as a
whole.").
54. Will, supra note 2, at 114-15 (noting that nothing happened to the gamblers,
that some of the players were "guilty primarily of stupidity," and that most of the
players were cheated out of their promised money).
55. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 338; Voigt, supra note 7, at 130.
56. Voigt, supra note 7, at 130. Voigt believed that in 1970, the year of his book's
publication, Landis's ruling would be considered "preposterous." Id. "[lts imposition
in 1921 rested on the moralistic consensus of baseball people and the support of a
populace unaware of the undesirable effect on civil liberties and over-aware of moral-
istic strictures." Id. But see James Reston, Jr., Collision at Home Plate: The Lives of
Pete Rose and Bart Giamatti 271 (1991) ("To join organized baseball was to divest
the traditional rights of American citizenship and cede them to the commissioner.").
57. Seymour, supra note 5, at 338 (explaining that Landis "recognized no degrees
of guilt [and cut ball players acquitted in a court of law] off from their livelihood").
58. See, e.g., id at 339 ("The end of the Black Sox scandal.., glorified Landis as a
savior whose stern penalties had restored Organized Baseball to purity.").
59. Id at 338.
60. Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 53 ("By the time the 1921 season was over, there
wasn't much doubt that Kenesaw Mountain Landis was the boss of baseball. The
drastic punishments [he imposed] spoke eloquently of the tremendous power wielded
by the dandy little judge with the shaggy white hair.").
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cation with the proposition that even the appearance of evil would be
rooted out of baseball." 6 1
In his first decade in office, Commissioner Landis banished
nineteen players, including the "Black Sox," from organized base-
ball.62 Throughout his entire reign, Landis wielded his best interests
powers broadly, striking at some of the biggest names in the game.
Landis, however, did not limit himself to regulating players. 63 For ex-
ample, in 1920, the owner of the New York Giants, Horace Stoneham,
and the team's manager, John McGraw, purchased a race track and
casino in Havana, Cuba.6' Although owners were frequently involved
in horse racing before the days of Landis, the new commissioner de-
cided that no one in baseball could associate with gambling and the
inevitable crookedness that flowed from it.65 He informed Stoneham
and McGraw that they would have to choose between their property
in Cuba and their executive positions in baseball. 66 The fact that Mc-
Graw owned property in Cuba and vacationed there in the winter
meant nothing to Landis.67 The two New York Giants executives
quickly divested themselves of the race track.68
Landis also used his authority to penalize athletes for conduct
outside of the game of baseball. In 1920, Benny Kauff, an outfielder
for the New York Giants, was arrested and indicted for stealing a car
and for receiving stolen cars at an automobile dealership he owned.69
Believing the indictment implied probable guilt, Landis placed Kauff
on the ineligible list for the 1921 season while the case was pending.70
In May 1921, a jury acquitted Kauff, prompting Kauff to apply to Lan-
dis's office for reinstatement.7' After reading the trial papers, Landis
determined that the evidence compromised Kauff's character and rep-
utation to the extent that his continued presence in Organized Base-
ball would "burden patrons of the game with grave apprehension as to
its integrity. ' 72 Calling Kauff's acquittal "one of the worst miscar-
riages of justice that ever came under [his] observation," Landis
61. White, supra note 5, at 110.
62. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 8.
63. See Simons, supra note 6, at 10 ("Social position and financial standing had no
effect on Landis.").
64. See White, supra note 5, at 111.
65. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 389.
66. See id. Throughout the remainder of his term, Landis would continue to frown
on any association between horse racing and baseball. In the 1930s, Bing Crosby
attempted to purchase an ownership share in a major league team, but Landis re-
jected his attempts, "believing that Crosby was too actively involved with the horse
racing industry." White, supra note 5, at 111.
67. See White, supra note 5, at 111.
68. See id.
69. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 374.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 375.
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banned the Giants' outfielder from baseball for life. 3 Baseball schol-
ars have also criticized Landis for this decision; the Commissioner
banished Kauff for a crime of which he was acquitted, having no rela-
tion to baseball.74
Landis demonstrated that he feared no player when, in 1921, he
took on the great Babe Ruth.75 Confident that he was untouchable,
Ruth defied Landis by violating a rule that prohibited players who
appeared in the World Series from barnstorming76 immediately after
the Series ended.77 When Ruth heard that Landis was contemplating
punishment, he suggested that Landis "jump in a lake."'78 Ruth felt
that a player's productive period in his career was short, and that play-
ers should be able to take advantage of the opportunity to earn extra
money.79 The owners, however, had enacted the rule to avoid the
possibility of destroying the prestige of the World Series.' Next to
the Black Sox scandal, this decision may have been Landis's most crit-
ical: "Landis was perfectly aware that he had to sit on Ruth hard or
abdicate his new throne. He knew that he would quickly lose his con-
trol over the game if it were spread on the record that he had been
unable to control the great Ruth. 81
Landis believed that the Ruth case involved the question "of who
[was] the biggest man in baseball, the Commissioner or the player
who makes the most home runs."'  Though inclement weather cut
Ruth's barnstorming tour short, Landis declared that Ruth and two
other New York Yankees would not receive their World Series shares
73. See id. at 374-75.
74. See White, supra note 5, at 113 ("Landis seemed to have substituted his intui-
tion that Kauff was a dishonorable character for the judgment of two juries."); Sey-
mour, supra note 5, at 375 ("Exonerated under the law of the land, Kauff was still
subject to the 'law' of that government within a government which is Organized
Baseball.").
75. Babe Ruth has also received considerable credit for reviving professional
baseball after the Black Sox scandal. See Bowie Kuhn, Hardball: The Education of a
Baseball Commissioner 24 (1987) ("Along with Babe Ruth, Landis snatched baseball
from the disaster it faced with the Black Sox.").
76. Barnstorming was an activity where, during the off-season, players would tour
non-baseball locations in the country playing "pick-up" games for money. See Paul
Saitowitz, Carry a Big Stick-- Fullerton Man Went Barnstorming wvith Satchel Paige's
Team, Orange County Register (Cal.), Oct. 15, 1998, at 16.
77. See Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 53 (stating that Ruth was "blissfully confident
of his own stature as the No. 1 man in the game").
78. Helyar, supra note 6, at 8.
79. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 392.
80. See idL Although the World Series was baseball's premier event, most trea-
sured the opportunity to see Babe Ruth play in their hometown.
81. Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 53.
82. Seymour, supra note 5, at 392 (quoting Landis); see also Helyar, supra note 6,
at 9 ("It seems I'll have to show somebody who's running this game." (quoting Lan-
dis)); Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 53 ("The situation involves not merely rule viola-
tion ... but, rather, a mutinous defiance by the players intended to present the
question: Which is the bigger, baseball or any individual in baseball?").
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and would be suspended until May 20 of the following season (missing
approximately forty games).83 Faced with the loss of Ruth and the
revenues he produced, Yankee attorneys pleaded with Landis to alter
the suspensions.' Even owners of other teams sought to reduce the
suspension to minimize their financial losses.8 Finally, Ruth went to
the commissioner himself to plead his case, but Landis refused to see
the Yankee slugger.86 The players eventually received their World Se-
ries money, but Landis refused to hedge on the suspensions.87
Though the Ruth episode eventually produced a change in the barn-
storming rule, Commissioner Landis had again asserted his grandiose
authority.88 On this occasion, he tamed the game's greatest star.
In 1931, Commissioner Landis faced the only judicial challenge to
his authority throughout his term. In Milwaukee American Ass'n v.
Landis,9 Phil Ball, owner of the St. Louis Browns, sued Landis over
the disposition of Fred Bennett, an outfielder who played in just seven
games with the Browns.9" To avoid placing Bennett on the Browns'
waiver list, which would have allowed another major league team to
claim Bennett's services, Ball "shuttled" the outfielder around five of
the Browns' minor league affiliates. 91 Discontented with his treat-
ment, Bennett asked Landis to free him from the Browns and to allow
him to contract with another major league team.92 An opponent of
the minor-league "farm systems, 93 Landis ruled that Bennett "should
be returned to St. Louis, which must either retain him as a Major
League player for the year or longer, transfer him outright to some
club not controlled or owned by St. Louis or its owners or release him
unconditionally."94
Ball challenged the commissioner's authority to act in this manner,
seeking to enjoin the commissioner's interference with the Browns'
player relations.95 After examining the Major League agreement and
reciting its provision within the text of the case, the Northern District
of Illinois concluded that the agreement granted the commissioner ex-
tremely broad powers to police the sport:
83. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 393.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 53.
88. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 393.
89. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
90. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 40. Phil Ball was a longtime Landis opponent.
Ball was the only owner who did not sign the original Major League Agreement certi-
fying Landis's absolute power. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. The "farm system" is a collection of minor leagues where major league teams
develop young player's talent for possible promotion to the major leagues. See Sey-
mour, supra note 5, at 400.
94. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 300.
95. See id. at 298-99.
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The various agreements and rules, constituting a complete code for,
or charter and by-laws of, organized baseball in America, disclose a
clear intent upon the part of the parties to endow the commissioner
with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot and all the
disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias.96
Challenging the MLA's "Pledge of Loyalty,"9 7 Ball argued that such a
wide grant of discretion was merely an attempt to "deprive the court
of its jurisdiction," and that any agreement not to bring legal action
was contrary to public policy.98 The court dismissed Ball's argument,
pointing out that arbitral agreements were commonly held to be
valid.9 9
The court noted that Commissioner Landis maintained his broad
powers to "foster keen, clean competition in the sport of baseball, to
preserve discipline and a high standard of morale, [and] to produce an
equality of conditions necessary to the promotion of keen competi-
tion."'10 For the commissioner to accomplish these tasks, the court
recognized that the judiciary must defer to commissioner rulings, ob-
serving that the parties to the Major League Agreement contractually
agreed that Landis's good faith decisions would be "absolutely bind-
ing."10' Finding that he did not act in an arbitrary or fraudulent man-
ner, the court held that the commissioner acted within the broad
confines of his authority. 02
Milwaukee American Ass'n v. Landis solidified "Landis's autocratic
powers.' 0 3 A court of law had given credence to what most of base-
ball already knew-Landis's authority was absolute. 10 Though few
disciplinary disputes have reached the judiciary since, the decision set
the precedent for future judicial treatment of commissioner discipli-
nary decisions: unless the commissioner acted in an arbitrary or
fraudulent fashion, his best interests decisions would be final and
binding upon all parties. 05
Through his effort alone, Kenesaw Mountain Landis neither saved
nor revived popular interest in baseball."m He did, however, return
96. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
97. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
98. Milvaukee Am. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 303.
99. See id The court stated, however, that a judge may overrule a decision of an
arbiter if that decision was "unsupported by evidence,.. . without legal foundation or
beyond legal recognition." Id.
100. Id. at 301.
101. Id. at 302.
102. See id. at 304.
103. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 41.
104. See Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 49.
105. See Milvaukee Am. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 303 ("No doubt the decision of any arbi-
ter, umpire, engineer, or similar person endowed with the power to decide may not be
exercised in an illegal manner, that is fraudulently, arbitrarily, without legal basis for
the same or without any evidence to justify action.")
106. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 420.
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accountability to baseball. He provided a "symbol that reassured the
public of baseball's honesty and integrity. 10 7 Some believed that
Landis was an "impulsive, opinionated despot whose operative princi-
ples were the preservation of his autocratic powers and the implemen-
tation of his often whimsical judgments."' 8 A journalist once called
him "America's only successful dictator."'1 9 However one may view
Landis's arbitrary nature, it is hard to deny that through his impact on
the nation's pastime, he "wove himself into the fabric of America." ' 0
Upon his death, the public again regarded baseball "as a sport that
deserved to be thought the ideal of youth, a sport that was clean and
wholesome.""'
Kenesaw Mountain Landis did not merely influence the position of
commissioner; he defined the very nature of the position itself. En-
dowed with great powers, he did what he believed was correct to pro-
tect the best interests of his sport. Though Landis had his critics and
inconsistency plagued his decisions, 12 his commitment to baseball
never wavered." 3 This steadfast resolve helped Landis rebuild the
public's great respect for baseball that had been virtually destroyed by
the Black Sox scandal." 4 Though many disagreed with the methods
by which he ruled, Landis established the benchmark by which all fu-
ture commissioners would be measured. 15
B. Post-Landis Baseball
Landis's successor, "Happy" Chandler, was a United States Senator
from Kentucky. The owners believed that Chandler's contacts in
Washington would aid baseball in retaining its exemption from the
nation's antitrust laws." 6 Ultimately, history would remember Chan-
dler as the commissioner who permitted the racial integration of base-
107. Id. at 422; see also Kuhn, supra note 75, at 24 ("[H]e established baseball's
reputation for integrity."); Helyar, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that "Landis looked like
God").
108. White, supra note 5, at 126; see also Voigt, supra note 7, at 149 ("His death
marked the end of the autocratic commission rule.").
109. Simons, supra note 7, at 8.
110. Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 49 ("[Landis] loomed as large in the public mind
as any of the Presidents of his country. He was as much a part of the national scene as
the Golden Gate Bridge, the White House, or the Empire State Building.").
111. White, supra note 5, at 126.
112. See id. at 111 (pointing out that Landis's decisions appeared "inconsistent to
the point of being arbitrary").
113. See generally Simons, supra note 6, at 8 ("He exercised [his authority] with an
iron fist. There was no recourse from his decisions and he threw as much fear into the
hearts of the major league club owners who hired him and paid his salary as he did
into erring ball players who violated the rules.").
114. See Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 49 (stating that Landis constructed "a solid
rock of public respect under the game").
115. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 367.
116. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 45; infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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ball.117 Although he rarely exercised his best interests authority, he
demanded that he retain the authority nonetheless.118
Happy Chandler's primary disciplinary battle came with Leo
Durocher, the popular yet controversial manager of the Brooklyn
Dodgers. Durocher's questionable behavior began in Landis's term
when the Dodgers' manager left four game tickets to film star George
Raft, who some believed had ties with gambling and organized
crime. 119 Over the next six years, Landis and Chandler repeatedly
warned Durocher that his personal contacts reflected poorly upon the
game of baseball. 20 The final episode leading to Durocher's suspen-
sion occurred when he "declared war" on the New York Yankees
before the 1947 season, accusing Larry MacPhail, a one-third owner of
the Yankees, of misconduct.121 MacPhail fied a formal protest with
the commissioner's office, arguing that Durocher had slandered the
Yankee organization, which constituted conduct detrimental to base-
ball.1 - In addition to the above activity, Durocher also faced feloni-
ous assault charges for attacking a fan with a blunt instrument.' 23 A
jury later acquitted Durocher of the charges. 24
On April 9, 1947, Chandler suspended Durocher for one year from
Major League Baseball." Chandler charged that Durocher had "not
measured up to the standards expected or required of managers of our
baseball teams." 26 The Commissioner held that the accumulation of
Durocher's incidents constituted conduct detrimental to baseball and
that suspending Durocher was necessary to protect the game.12 7
MLB's next two commissioners, Ford Frick and General William
Eckert, did not engage in any highly publicized disciplinary actions
during their terms. Frick had been the National League's president
117. In 1947, Jackie Robinson signed a contract with the Brooklyn Dodgers, be-
coming the first African-American player in MLB. See White, supra note 5, at 148.
118. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 45.
119. See id. at 54. Among Raft's alleged contacts were two notorious mobsters,
Ownie Madden and Bugsy Siegel. See id. at 56.
120. See id. at 56-58. Westbrook Pegler, a former sportswriter, reported in 1946
that Durocher kept ties with three high profile gamblers: Joe Adonis, Memphis En-
gelberg, and Connie Immerman. See id. at 56.
121. See id at 59-60.
122. See id. at 61.
123. See id at 62. Durocher struck the fan after the fan called the manager a
"crook" and a "bum." Id
124. See id.
125. See id. at 53, 63.
126. Id. at 63.
127. See id. In 1947, the Catholic Youth Organization of Brooklyn withdrew its
membership from the Dodger's Knothole Club, which provided free Dodgers tickets
to more than 150,000 children each year. See id. at 61. In the letter of resignation, the
organization's director, Vincent Powell, stated that Durocher was "undermining the
moral training of our youth and represents an example in complete contradiction of
our moral teachings." Id
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for seventeen years prior to becoming commissioner. 2 8 Though Frick
took his responsibilities seriously,'29 he ultimately believed that the
individual leagues (American and National) should handle most disci-
plinary actions. Eckert, on the other hand, knew very little about
baseball, 13° but he had contacts in Washington.13 ' Once the owners
discovered, though, that Eckert's contacts were in the Pentagon,
rather than on Capitol Hill, they ended his term after only three
years.132
C. Bowie Kuhn
In 1968, MLB named Bowie Kuhn, a partner in the New York City
law firm Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, as its fifth commissioner. 133 At
Willkie, Kuhn had performed legal services for the National League
for eighteen years, thereby becoming a "baseball insider.' 34 From
the beginning of his term, Kuhn set out to restore the traditional con-
cept of the commissioner's office, with the commissioner acting as a
"benevolent monarch.' 1 35 He believed that he had a duty to protect
the game's integrity and a responsibility to oversee the interests of the
owners, players, and fans alike. 136
Throughout the first ten years of his term, a majority of Kuhn's ac-
tions were intrinsically tied to the reserve clause. The reserve clause
was a portion of the uniform players contract that, until 1976, gave
teams an exclusive and perpetual option to utilize a player's serv-
ices.' 3 7 Under this system, a player was inextricably bound to his
128. See id. at 85. In addition, Ford Frick had been a New York baseball writer and
among Babe Ruth's group of ghost writers. See id. at 85, 91.
129. See id. at 107
The fundamental power of the commissioner ... is to deal with conduct
detrimental to baseball. That authority is the strongest single agent baseball
has for keeping its skirts clear of crookedness, of game-throwing, of gam-
bling and of unsportsmanlike conduct of any kind. Without it, and without
the right and authority within our own organization, to keep our own house
in order, public confidence and public faith would be destroyed.
Id. (quoting Frick).
130. At Eckert's inaugural press conference, a reporter asked Eckert when he had
last seen a major league baseball game. Eckert replied that he had been to Los Ange-
les and seen the Dodgers play a year or two earlier. As the questioning continued,
however, it became clear that Eckert did not know that the Dodgers had previously
played in Brooklyn. See id. at 122.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 137. A critical factor in Kuhn's decision to join Willkie, Farr & Gal.
lagher was that the "firm's impressive roster of clients included the National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs." Kuhn, supra note 75, at 17.
134. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 134-35.
135. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 107; see also Kuhn, supra note 75, at 18 (titling a
chapter in his autobiography "Commissioner Landis Beckons").
136. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 107.
137. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 6. The reserve clause states that "[ijf, prior to
March 1, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the term of the contract, then,
on or before ten days after said March 1, the Club shall have the right by written
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team, unless the team traded, sold, or dismissed him.'m The owners
believed the reserve system was necessary to limit the market for play-
ers' services; otherwise, the wealthiest clubs could monopolize the tal-
ent within the league and destroy any sense of equal competition. 139
Baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws 4 ' and the lack of a
player's union precluded any serious challenges to the league's mo-
nopsony over player services before 1970. During Kuhn's term, how-
ever, the reserve system would come under considerable fire,
requiring the commissioner to use his best interests powers to try to
save the clause. Ultimately, after the clause's demise, Kuhn had to use
his authority to regulate baseball under its new free agency system.
In the early years of Kuhn's term, the commissioner's authority over
all league discipline remained absolute. In 1967, however, the newly-
named head of the MLBPA, Marvin Miller, aimed to install grievance
arbitration into baseball's collective bargaining agreement.' Miller
wanted independent arbitration for player grievances brought against
either the league or a particular team. 4 2 He did not believe that the
commissioner of baseball, hired and paid by the team owners, could
be an impartial decision-maker in disputes brought against those own-
ers.143 In Miller's eyes, the arbitrator would act as a buffer between
management and labor, while protecting the players from commis-
sioners' arbitrary rulings."4 In 1968, Miller failed in his attempt to get
independent arbitration, but he did obtain a systematic grievance pro-
cedure where players could follow certain channels to appeal their
grievances to the commissioner. s
notice to the player to renew this contract for the period of one year." Holtzman,
supra note 4, at 157.
138. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 21. Although Judge Landis often confided to
friends that he believed the reserve clause was illegal, he "vowed to safeguard the
baseball establishment against any professional competition." Id.
139. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 7.
140. In 1922, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Organized Baseball was
not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, holding the sport was not involved in inter-
state commerce. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
141. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 36 (explaining that to Miller, grievance arbitration
"was as basic as breathing"). In 1966, the players elected Miller as the first executive
director of the MLBPA. See id. at 25. Prior to his election to the MLBPA, Miller was
the chief economist and assistant to the president of the United Steelworkers of
America. See id at 19-20. At the MLBPA, Miller first aimed to educate his constitu-
ency and himself as to the inadequate labor conditions under which the players
worked. See id at 28-29. In 1967, Miller used this education to negotiate baseball's
first ever Basic Agreement. See id. at 29, 35-38.
142. See id
143. See generally Holtzman, supra note 4, at 153 ("[Commissioners] could make
up any ruling they wanted. They could say up is down and down is up." (quoting
Miller)).
144. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 36.
145. See iUi at 79.
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In 1970, Miller would have more success. When the new labor ne-
gotiations began, the union had gained new leverage: Curt Flood, a
St. Louis Cardinal outfielder, had commenced a lawsuit challenging
baseball's reserve system. 146 With the lawsuit before the United
States Supreme Court, 47 Miller believed that management was vul-
nerable and that independent arbitration was within his grasp. 48
Miller informed John Gaherin, a management negotiator, that the
baseball owners would have to agree to neutral arbitration before the
union would sign any labor contract.' 49
Commissioner Kuhn was the primary obstacle to Miller's demands.
Kuhn was prepared to invoke article IX, section 1 of the Major
League Agreement, which the original signers had inserted into base-
ball's governing document. The clause promised that "no diminution
of the compensation or powers of the present or any succeeding Com-
missioner shall be made during his term of office."15 At the outset of
negotiations, Kuhn would not accept any decrease in his powers.' 5 '
He soon realized, however, that for baseball to continue without a
labor stoppage, he would have to accept some change in baseball's
grievance system. 152 Kuhn approved the use of an outside arbitrator,
but only for grievances that did not implicate baseball's integrity or
public confidence in the game.'53 Kuhn especially wanted to retain
authority over disputes that involved possible corruption, arguing that
baseball's owners created the commissioner's office specifically to
grant the commissioner such authority.' 54
The parties ultimately agreed that the commissioner would continue
to adjudicate any controversies that reflected on the integrity of, and
the public's faith in, baseball. An outside arbitrator, though, would
handle all other labor grievances and be responsible for interpreting
146. Between the 1969 and 1970 season, the St. Louis Cardinals traded Curt Flood
to the Philadelphia Phillies. Having no desire to leave St. Louis, Flood believed that
he had the right to consider offers from other teams before being unilaterally placed
in Philadelphia. See id. at 103-04. When Kuhn informed Flood that he would not
become a free agent, Flood challenged the reserve clause under the antitrust laws,
charging that he was being deprived of his civil liberties. See Holtzman, supra note 4,
at 143.
147. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
148. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 104 ("How could baseball argue that Curt Flood
was wrong and the industry was eminently fair to players if their only appeal on griev-
ances was to the commissioner?").
149. See id. at 104-05.
150. Major League Agreement art. IX, § 1 (1921); see also Helyar, supra note 6, at
107 ("A commissioner's powers can't be diminished without his assent, under the
terms of the Major League Agreement that created the office.").
151. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 108.
152. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 141 (pointing out that arbitral grievances were
commonplace in American collective bargaining agreements and that sports manage-
ment could no longer resist their use).
153. See id.
154. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 109.
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the league's collective bargaining agreement. 5 ' Although the Com-
missioner maintained his authority to police the game's best interests,
Miller had won a "crucial victory": the commissioner could no longer
rule without giving thought to the limits of his authority."s
Initially, the change in the league's grievance procedure did not
have a significant impact. The media scarcely noticed the change, and
baseball's owners did not truly understand the ramifications of their
concession. 157 In 1970, though, for the first time since 1920, an indi-
vidual other than the commissioner had the last word on a baseball
disciplinary decision. During that year's season, the California Angels
suspended Alex Johnson, an outfielder, for his lackadaisical play in
the field.158 Although many of the players on the Angels felt the sus-
pension was just, Miller believed that Johnson may have been emo-
tionally disturbed, and that he required placement on the disabled
list. 59 The MLBPA filed a grievance on Johnson's behalf challenging
the Angels' suspension. 6 Both American League President Joe
Cronin and Commissioner Kuhn upheld the suspension as a valid ex-
ercise of player discipline by a team.16' Arbitrator Lewis Gill, how-
ever, overruled the Angels, Cronin, and Kuhn, deciding that Johnson
was emotionally ill and belonged on the disabled list.16 As a result of
this ruling, it became abundantly clear that the commissioner no
longer had the final word on player discipline.' 63
Jim "Catfish" Hunter, a pitcher on the Oakland Athletics, was the
next to benefit from baseball's new arbitration system. In 1974,
Hunter's contract stipulated that Charles Finley, the team's owner,
pay $50,000 of Hunter's $100,000 salary into an annuity collectible in
ten years.16' Finley was supposed to pay the $50,000 to a North Caro-
lina insurance company over the course of the season."6 After dis-
covering the $50,000 was not immediately tax deductible as an
ordinary business expense, Finley refused to make the payment.'6
Upon hearing of Hunter's situation, Miller contacted Hunter to ask if
the pitcher wanted the union to become involved. Hunter said yes,
and the union notified Finley that unless he complied with the terms
155. See id
156. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 153.
157. See id. at 154.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 154-55.
160. See &L at 156.
161. See id. at 155.
162. See id Arbitrator Gill's decision was groundbreaking, for it was "the first time
mental illness was equated with physical injury." Id.
163. See id at 154 ("The belief that the commissioner was the all-powerful, all-
knowing czar wasn't shattered until a grievance was filed on behalf of Alex Johnson
164. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 137.
165. See id-
166. See id.
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of the contract within ten days, Hunter would terminate his playing
agreement.
167
News of the threat prompted Finley to contact Hunter and arrange
a meeting with his disgruntled pitcher and American League Presi-
dent Lee MacPhail. At the meeting, Finley offered Hunter a $50,000
check, which Hunter rejected because the terms of the agreement re-
quired direct payment to the insurance company.' 68 After this meet-
ing, the MLBPA filed a grievance requesting free agency for Hunter,
arguing that Finley's failure to comply with Hunter's contract required
such. 69 Arbitrator Peter Seitz found for Hunter, declaring that
Hunter was no longer bound to the Athletics under his contract and
thus was a free agent. 17
Although Seitz did not overrule a commissioner decision during this
arbitration, the events that occurred after the arbitrator's ruling re-
vealed baseball's new power structure. Immediately after the arbitra-
tion, Kuhn forbade all teams from bidding on the free agent
Hunter.' 71 The commissioner wanted to review Seitz's decision and
give Finley time to appeal before Hunter signed another contract. 72
Miller, however, threatened Kuhn that if the Commissioner abrogated
the arbitration award, then the MLBPA would sue the league.' 73 Fac-
ing a possible lawsuit, Kuhn backed off and announced that all clubs
could begin contacting Hunter and his agents.' 74
Despite Kuhn's diminished power in grievance arbitration, he still
retained the ability to determine the best interests of baseball by po-
licing owner action. In what would be the first of a number of con-
frontations with Charlie Finley, 75 Commissioner Kuhn overturned
Finley's decision to place his young outfielder, Reggie Jackson, in the
minor leagues.' 76 In 1969, at the age of twenty-three, Jackson had hit
forty-seven home runs. Paid only $20,000 in 1969, Jackson requested
$75,000 for the 1970 season.' 77 Finley offered $40,000 and would not
budge. Although Jackson signed just ten days before the season be-
gan, he was a regular in Oakland's outfield.' 78 Not surprisingly, his
late signing handicapped his performance. 79 To punish Jackson for
his insubordination and his slow start, Finley sent him down to the
167. See id.
168. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 155.
169. See id. at 156.
170. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 140.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 156. Hunter ultimately received a $3.2 million
contract payable over five years from the New York Yankees. See id.
175. See infra Part II.A.
176. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 127.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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minor leagues.'8 0 To protect both Reggie Jackson and the reserve sys-
tem, Commissioner Kuhn stepped in and reversed Jackson's demo-
tion. 81 Critics of the reserve system argued that it enabled the
owners to hold "complete power over their players and that such
power could be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously."'182 To avoid this
criticism, Kuhn exercised his best interests authority to protect not
only one of the game's rising stars, but also the public's perception
that the game and its system of retaining players was fair.1 3
In 1972, Kuhn again battled with Finley over a team dispute with
another of the A's young stars. In 1971, Vida Blue won both the Most
Valuable Player Award and the Cy Young Award in his first full year
in the American League."s After the season, Blue asked for a salary
of $115,000, to which Finley offered a non-negotiable $50,0 0 0.1s1 Blue
refused to sign Finley's contract, and instead of reporting to spring
training, returned to his Louisiana home.' 6 Unhappy that the game's
"hottest talent" was sitting at home at the beginning of the season,
Kuhn asked the two parties to come before him and discuss their dif-
ferences.'8 7 Finley responded that the matter was beyond the purview
of the commissioner's office, because salary disputes were purely a
team issue. 8 Kuhn, however, saw the issue in the broader context of
what was good for baseball. 8 9 First, according to Kuhn, the public
wanted to see the previous year's most valuable player on the
mound.'90 Second, Kuhn again believed that Finley's arbitrary actions
threatened the tentative status of the reserve system.' 9' If Finley con-
tinued to treat his players like property, Kuhn reasoned it would be
difficult for baseball's hierarchy to continue defending the fairness
180. See id. (noting that the action was unfair because "it was motivated by per-
sonal reasons unrelated to Jackson's ability").
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 131.
185. See id
186. See id
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. ("As far as I was concerned, I was the paterfamilias of the game and I
could step in wherever I thought appropriate.").
190. See id. at 132.
191. See id. at 134. In a letter to Finley concerning the Blue matter, Kuhn stated:
It is my continuing judgment that your conduct undermines Baseball's cen-
tral administrative system and public respect for that system. Unfortunately,
you seem to have little or no appreciation of how critically important that
system is to the game. You seem to put first and foremost your own desire
to act as you feel serves your own interest. Left unchecked, such conduct
would destroy the Major League partnership to which you are a party
through the Major League Agreement and Rules.
1999] 1665
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and legality of the reserve system."9 Determining that Blue's pres-
ence in the league would advance baseball's best interests, Kuhn me-
diated a twenty-two hour negotiating session between Blue and
Finley.'93 Though both parties were hostile and viewed Kuhn with
"equal suspicion," Blue and Finley eventually agreed to a package
worth $63,000.1'
Kuhn's early success with his "best interests" powers came largely
at the expense of baseball's ownership. In 1975, however, Kuhn
would have to measure his authority in relation to Miller's powerful
union as the MLBPA filed grievances on behalf of two pitchers, Andy
Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of the
Montreal Expos.195 Though neither Messersmith nor McNally had
signed contracts to play the 1975 season, both of their teams renewed
their contracts through the reserve clause.' 96 Willing to serve as the
union's guinea pigs, Messersmith and McNally gave permission to
Marvin Miller to submit before arbitration the issue that the Supreme
Court, five years earlier, was unwilling to resolve: what was the
proper scope of the renewal provision within the uniform player
contract?
197
Commissioner Kuhn now faced a crucial decision. He still retained
authority over grievances that implicated the integrity of the game. 98
He could thus remove the Messersmith-McNally grievance from Arbi-
trator Peter Seitz, claiming that the "potential destruction" of the re-
serve system threatened the integrity of, and the public's confidence
in, baseball.'99 Though Kuhn did indeed believe the issue before Seitz
should come before the commissioner, he was reluctant to invoke his
authority.2" Kuhn was concerned that taking the grievance away
from the arbitrator would destroy relations between the union and
ownership."0 ' John Gaherin also advised Kuhn that the players might
respond by striking if Seitz did not decide the grievance.202 Ulti-
192. See id. ("Finley's abuse of his players was knocking away the props that sup-
ported baseball's reserve system.").
193. See id. at 132.
194. See id. Blue's conflict with Finley, however, clearly flustered the young star.
In 1972, Blue won six games while losing ten, and though he had 301 strikeouts in
1971, he never reached 200 again. See id. at 134.
195. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 159.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 157; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing Curt
Flood's suit before the Supreme Court).
198. Article 10, item A.L.(b) of the Basic Agreement provided that: "'[G]rievancc'
shall not mean a complaint which involves action taken with respect to a Player or
Players by the Commissioner involving the preservation of the integrity of, or the
maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball." Kuhn, supra note 75, at
157 (citing the Basic Agreement).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 157-58.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 158.
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mately, Kuhn allowed the grievance procedure to run its course. 0 3
Arbitrator Seitz subsequently ruled that the renewal clause in the uni-
form player contract was not perpetual and that teams could only be
exercise the option for one year, thus making both Messersmith and
McNally free agents.'
Although Kuhn decided not to meddle in the grievance system,
Miller's fear of the Commissioner's power to do so led to further dimi-
nution of the commissioner's authority.0 5 Miller was concerned that
Kuhn would unilaterally terminate the union's efforts to obtain free
agency" 6 by determining the new system was not in the best interests
of baseball." 7 To guarantee that Kuhn would leave free agency un-
touched, Miller demanded that the 1976 CBA bar the commissioner
from interfering in matters subject to collective bargaining." Again,
Kuhn was the primary obstacle to Miller's demands; Kuhn felt that he
had already sacrificed more power than he thought vise to grievance
arbitration. 9 But Kuhn was still unvilling to stand in the way of an
agreement between the parties and relinquished his authority to settle
disputes concerning subjects of bargaining.210
Though the Messersmith-McNally arbitration had only an indirect
impact on the commissioner's authority, baseball's new free agency
system played a significant role in solidifying the judiciary's stance on
the review of commissioner decisions. In 1977 and 1978, Kuhn's regu-
lation of the new free agency system prompted two federal lawsuits
against baseball that challenged the commissioner's authority under
the Major League Agreement.21
Throughout the final five years of his term, Kuhn focused his efforts
on the proliferation of drug use within MLB. Kuhn believed that the
increased disposable income that came with free agency also increased
203. In his autobiography, Kuhn noted that his greatest regret as commissioner was
his failure to remove the grievance from Arbitrator Seitz. See id.
204. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 161 ("[A]fter one year there was no contractual
bond between player and club. Players who played out their renewal year were free
to negotiate with any major league team.").
205. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 195-96 ("Miller... feared what Kuhn might do,
during this unsettled period, in the name of 'integrity of the game.' [He'd] been
scared to death [Kuhn] would snatch the Messersinith case from Seitz on those
grounds.").
206. Generally, a free agent is a player who can sign a player contract with any
team in a league.
207. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 196 ("I just kept thinking, 'What if we negotiate all
this [free agency] and the commissioner stepped in and said, -I rule that free agency
involves the integrity of the game?""' (quoting Miller)).
208. See id Under Miller's proposed system, Kuhn's non-reviewable authority con-
cerning players would be limited to scandal-related issues. See id.
209. See id. ("This time, Kuhn resisted even more stubbornly. He'd been in office
longer, and he'd seen what came of tossing Miller a bone. That independent arbitra-
tor who 'wouldn't handle anything vital?' Right-he only gutted the reserve
system.").
210. See id. (noting that "Kuhn's powers were, indeed, being whittled away").
211. See infra Part II.
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the likelihood of player drug abuse.2 12 The commissioner further be-
lieved that to maintain the game's relationship with the public, it was
necessary to eliminate the influence of drugs from baseball. 13
In August 1980, Ontario police arrested Ferguson Jenkins of the
Texas Rangers at the Toronto Airport for possession of two ounces of
marijuana, two grams of hashish, and four grams of cocaine. 1 4
Shortly after the arrest, Kuhn summoned Jenkins to New York to
question him about the incident, in hopes of limiting any damage to
MLB's welfare.215 Jenkins, however, on the advice of his counsel, de-
clined to answer any questions, to avoid any prejudice in his pending
case in Canada. Kuhn determined that Jenkins's silence was a viola-
tion of the commissioner's contractual right to conduct investigations
and suspended the Ranger pitcher pending cooperation.216
To Kuhn's chagrin, the union quickly filed a grievance on Jenkins's
behalf.2 17 In September, Arbitrator Raymond Goetz overruled Com-
missioner Kuhn and reinstated Jenkins, calling the commissioner's
concern about the drug problem "mere surmise." ' 8 Kuhn quickly at-
tacked the decision, noting that athletes had a great responsibility to
act as role models for America's youth and to maintain the whole-
someness of the game. 19 Jenkins was later convicted of cocaine pos-
session, but his reputation and clean record prompted the Canadian
judge to discard the verdict and grant the pitcher an absolute
discharge.22°
Kuhn believed the arbitration award in the Jenkins grievance sent a
bad message: players who abused drugs could always count on the
212. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 304.
213. See id. at 303 (explaining that drug abuse was a problem that "had [a] tremen-
dous impact on our fans and threatened the foundations of our relationship with the
public").
In a 1984 grievance arbitration involving Kansas City Royals' centerfielder Willie
Wilson, the arbitrator agreed with Kuhn's assessment of drugs' influence on the game
of baseball: "And drug involvement, because of its threat to athletes' playing abili-
ties, because it is illegal and because of the related connotation of inroads by organ-
ized crime, constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the business that is
promoted as our national pastime." Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note
6, at 44.
214. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 305.
215. See id.
216. See id. For the Major League Agreement's provision on commissioner investi-
gation. see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
217. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 305 (noting that the grievance "dashed any hope
[the commissioner] might have harbored that the Players Association would take a
supportive view of [his] efforts to deal with the drug problem"). To Kuhn, the Jenkins
grievance was a sign that the union placed more importance on individual player
rights than on the general welfare of the game. See id. ("Never mind that player ca-
reers might well be destroyed by drug abuse; they were not going to cooperate with
the commissioner or management on the subject.").
218. Id. at 305-06.
219. See id. at 306.
220. See id.
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protection of the union, despite the impact that drugs had on base-
ball.Z"l Over the next several years, the MLBPA filed grievances fol-
lowing most of Kuhn's disciplinary decisions regarding drugs.="
Kuhn's greatest disappointment with the system came in 1984 con-
cerning a young pitcher from the Dominican Republic, Pascual Pe-
rez.' That January, while playing winter ball in his home country,
Perez was arrested with a half gram of cocaine in his wallet.224 In
March, Perez was tried, found guilty, and paid a $400 fine for posses-
sion of cocaine.' Upon his return to the United States, Kuhn sum-
moned Perez to New York to discuss the incident. Kuhn, believing
that Perez's responses to his questions displayed an unwillingness to
cooperate, suspended the Atlanta Braves pitcher for one month for
his crime. 6 The union's new executive director, Donald Fehr, filed a
grievance on Perez's behalf the day after Kuhn made his decision.227
Midway through the pitcher's sentence, Arbitrator Richard Bloch ter-
minated the suspension and allowed Perez to continue playing.?18
Kuhn was thoroughly disappointed with a system where an outsider
could second-guess his judgment, but ultimately conceded that for the
sake of labor peace, the commissioner's disciplinary authority could
no longer be absolute.
Bowie Kuhn wielded the commissioner's best interests authority
more frequently than any commissioner since Judge Landis. He chal-
lenged owners, players, and even some of the game's greatest stars2 9
By the end of his term, however, the commissioner's office was no
longer the omnipotent institution that Landis had created after the
Black Sox Scandal. The commissioner's authority to "determine, after
investigation, what preventive, remedial or punitive action [was] ap-
221. See id! ("I am afraid [the Jenkins arbitration] knocked the last latches off the
floodgates.").
222. For example, in the beginning of 1985, Arbitrator Richard Bloch shortened
Kuhn's one-year suspension of Kansas City Royals Willie Wilson and Jerry Martin to
six months. See id. at 314. Though Bloch agreed with Kuhn that "baseball ha[d] a
substantial interest in the implementation and enforcement of drug prohibitions," the
Arbitrator believed the one-year suspension was too severe in length. See Weiler &
Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 44.
223. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 316 ("My earlier disappointments with the arbitra-
tion process were mild compared with my reaction to the result in the matter of
pitcher Pascual Perez.").
224. See id. at 316-17.
225. See id. at 317.
226. See id. at 317-18. Kuhn also placed Perez on one year probation. See id. at 317.
227. See id.
228. See id
229. In 1979, Commissioner Kuhn asked Willie Mays, then an employee of the New
York Mets, to terminate his contract with the Mets when the former centerfielder
signed a part-time employment contract with Bally's Park Place Casino in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. See id. at 323-30. In 1983, Kuhn asked former Yankee great Mickey
Mantle to disassociate himself with the Yankees when he accepted a position with the
Claridge Hotel and Casino, also in Atlantic City. See Mantle Barred from Baseball
Activities, Daily Star (Oneonta, N.Y.), Feb. 9, 1983, at 11.
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propriate" 2  in a given circumstance was now subject, at the union's
request, to the review of an arbitrator. The days of Judge Landis were
officially over.
D. The 1980s and 1990s. The Fall of Pete Rose
In the fourteen years since Bowie Kuhn's reign, MLB has had four
commissioners. Peter Ueberroth followed Kuhn, serving for one five-
year term.23 1 After Ueberroth came then-president of the National
League, A. Bartlett Giamatti. 2  Giamatti's term only lasted 154 days;
he died of a massive heart attack on September 1, 1989.233 Though his
term was short, Giamatti made his mark on baseball and the commis-
sioner's office for his handling of the game's greatest scandal since the
Black Sox: the Pete Rose controversy.
In 1927, Commissioner Landis recommended, and the owners
adopted, anti-gambling rules that called for a lifetime ban for any
player who bet on a game in which he was involved.234 Though Lan-
dis had the ability to impose the punishment without implementing
the new standard, the owners chose to enact the rule to make the Na-
tional Agreement more "particularized." 235 The rules were largely
successful; yet, during the 1980s, perennial all-star Pete Rose began to
flirt with the most dreaded of baseball crimes.3 6
Pete Rose has more hits, singles, at-bats, and seasons with 200 or
more hits than any other player in history.237 Known for his all-out
style of play, Rose became a true fan favorite, earning the nickname
230. Major League Agreement, Jan. 12, 1921, § 2(a)-(b), at 1.
231. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 208-09.
232. Before his term with the National League, Giamatti was the president of Yale
University. See id. at 240-41. After Giamatti's death, Fay Vincent became baseball's
ninth commissioner. The Northern District of Illinois rejected one of Vincent's ac-
tions in baseball's best interests when it ruled that Vincent's attempt to re-align the
Chicago Cubs was an abuse of his authority, for it breached an explicit provision of
the Major League Agreement. See Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent
(N.D. Ill. 1992), reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at
24.
Vincent also suspended New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner for two
years from MLB for Steinbrenner's ties to a small-time gambler with mob connec-
tions, whom Steinbrenner allegedly paid to uncover damaging information about
Yankee outfielder, Dave Winfield. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 266-69. Allan
"Bud" Selig, the former majority owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, is the present
MLB commissioner. Selig Named Commissioner: Baseball's "New" Leader Held In-
terim Job for 2,131 Days, Detroit News, July 10, 1998, at F1.
233. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 255.
234. See Seymour, supra note 5, at 387.
235. Id.
236. See Will, supra note 2, at 200 ("[G]ambling remained baseball's capital
crime.").
237. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 245.
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"Charlie Hustle.' '238 But Rose had a severe gambling problem233 9 In
the 1980s, to fund his gambling habit, Rose became a fixture on both
the baseball card show circuit and in the booming sports memorabilia
trade.2' In 1985, he sold the bat with which he had broken Ty Cobb's
hit record for $125,000.241 To maximize his profits from that memora-
ble night, Rose changed shirts three times during the game so that he
could sell one shirt while holding onto the other two.2 42 He associated
with drug dealers, bookmakers, and memorabilia hustlers, all of whom
both revered him and helped finance his gambling addiction.243
Ultimately, the negative publicity from Rose's gambling was too
blatant for the commissioner's office to ignore.'" In his last days in
office, Commissioner Ueberroth summoned Rose to his office and
asked him whether he had ever gambled on baseball.245 When Rose
denied the allegation, Ueberroth cleared Rose's name and informed
the public that no further action would follow.246
A. Bartlett Giamatti, however, would not be as forgiving as Ueber-
roth. As commissioner, Giamatti believed his role was to purify base-
ball and fiercely maintain its integrity.247 He wanted to rid the
238. See Will, supra note 2, at 197 ("Rose's willfulness on the field made him much
loved in baseball's inner circle, and in the bleachers.... He excelled because he tried
harder than anyone else.").
239. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 400.
240. See id
241. See idl.
242. See Reston, supra note 56, at 250. Rose kept one jersey for himself, gave one
to Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott, and sold the third for $50,000. See id. Logic,
however, would dictate that if Rose changed shirts three times throughout the game,
he would have four shirts to distribute.
243. See id at 214 (noting that Rose "always had his gaggle of flunkies and para-
sites"); Will, supra note 2, at 198 (reviewing Reston's book on Rose and Giamatti,
Will states: "Reston gives new depth to the term 'lowlife' as he recounts Rose's slide
into gambling, debts, drugs, incessant adultery and the company of muscle-bound
dimwits resembling characters who wandered out of a Damon Runyon short story
that had been rewritten by Elmore Leonard").
244. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 401. See generally Will, supra note 2, at 198 ("By
1987 [Rose] was losing $30,000 a week to bookies-S34,000 on a single Super Bowl
bet.").
245. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 401.
246. See id
247. See Reston, supra note 56, at 225; see also Giamatti, supra note 1, at 120 ("I
believe baseball is an important, enduring American institution. It must assert and
aspire to the highest principles--of integrity, of professionalism of performance, of
fair play within its rules."); Holtzman, supra note 4, at 232 (stating that Giamatti's
"rigid belief [was that] the commissioner's essential assignment is to maintain the in-
tegrity of the game"). Giamatti was also obsessed with rules, and with adherence to
them. See Will, supra note 2, at 198 ("Giamatti's preoccupation, academic and other-
wise, was with excellence within the rules."). When attending baseball games as the
commissioner and as the National League president, Giamatti would often visit the
umpires before the game, for they were "the keepers of the rules, the ones who con-
trolled the fire of competition." Id.
Ultimately, Giamatti's intense love for baseball fueled his beliefs concerning his
role as commissioner. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 238. When Giamatti's Yale col-
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national pastime of drugs, rude behavior in the stands, sex scandals,
and other negative influences.248 Giamatti felt that if left to their nat-
ural devices, players were the true threats to baseball, and that it was
his duty to "contain their excesses."249 Thus, despite Ueberroth's
statement that the Rose matter was moot, Giamatti's investigation
was just beginning. First, Giamatti hired a Washington attorney
named John Dowd250 to conduct the inquiry.251 Dowd's reputation
for operating fierce investigations endeared him to baseball's manage-
ment, 2 which granted Dowd complete authority to investigate Rose
in the name of MLB.3 Dowd used this authority to ensure that Rose
would cooperate completely, for Rose knew that failure to do so
would be contractual grounds for suspension.
Just days after the investigation began, Dowd spoke with Paul Jan-
szen, a weightlifter and small-time steroids dealer who had been a
principal figure in Rose's entourage for two years.2 55 According to
Janszen, he and Rose had a falling out over a $44,000 debt Rose owed
Janszen for gambling losses. 6 Dowd also questioned Ron Peters, a
bookmaker who accepted and placed bets for Rose. 57 Both Janszen
and Peters informed Dowd that Rose had gambled on baseball. 8
Janszen's girlfriend, Danita Marcum, who was a frequent runner for
Rose, revealed that she had placed bets for Rose on the Cincinnati
leagues questioned his career change, Giamatti responded: "I'm almost 50 years old
and I have fallen in love. I'm running away with a beautiful redhead with flashing
eyes whose name is baseball." Id.
248. See Reston, supra note 56, at 225. See generally Holtzman, supra note 4, at 244
(referring to Giamatti as "[b]aseball's Cardozo").
249. Reston, supra note 56, at 263.
250. Dowd's past included time served as a prosecutor with the United States Jus-
tice Department, heading a strike force investigating organized crime. See Helyar,
supra note 6, at 401.
251. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 246-47.
252. See id. ("When Dowd sees evil, the gloves come off. If he went after the Pope,
he'd bring him down." (quoting then-Deputy Commissioner Fay Vincent)).
253. Dowd indulged in the wide latitude given to him by Giamatti. At the Justice
Department, the Bill of Rights handcuffed Dowd's ability to conduct what he believed
was a full investigation. As the commissioner's investigator, however, he had only to
ensure that the investigation was fair. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 402 ("He didn't
need a search warrant or a subpoena. He had only to invoke the threat of retribution
if a baseball man didn't cooperate with the commissioner. Even a star could be brow-
beaten into submission."). Dowd would later assert that "[t]he commissioner ha[d] a
right to everything." Id.
254. See Reston, supra note 56, at 279 ("Dowd had repeatedly warned the Rose
attorneys that any failure to cooperate with his investigation would be considered by
Bart Giamatti to be contrary to the best interests of baseball and would, in itself, be
grounds for suspension."); Will, supra note 2, at 124 ("The only contractual rights
involved are the commissioner's rights [to investigate], rights that Rose and everyone
else acknowledges when signing the standard player's contract.").
255. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 402.
256. See id.
257. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 249.
258. See id.
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Reds when Rose was the team's manager.2 9 At the conclusion of the
inquiry, Dowd submitted a 225-page report to Giamatti that con-
cluded that Rose placed bets on games in which he was personally
involved.26
Dowd's rapacity created trouble for Giamatti, leading a MLB com-
missioner into court for the first time since 1978. When Dowd ap-
proached Peters for information, Peters was awaiting sentencing in an
Ohio federal court on charges of cocaine trafficking 2 6' To induce
honesty, Dowd promised Peters that Giamatti would write a letter to
the sentencing judge that would explain Peters's cooperation in the
Rose investigation.262 In the Giamatti-signed letter written to Judge
Carl Rubin of the Southern District of Ohio, Dowd wrote: "Based
upon other information in our possession, I am satisfied Mr. Peters
has been candid, forthright and truthful.2 63 Judge Rubin, however,
was a diehard Cincinnati Reds fan, and though the letter pleaded for
confidentiality, he disclosed and denounced it, concluding that the
commissioner had a "vendetta" against Rose.26
After the letter went public, Rose's legal team filed suit in Ohio
state court to enjoin baseball's hearing on the Rose allegations, argu-
ing that Giamatti had prejudged the matter.6 5 They asked that base-
ball replace Giamatti with an "impartial decision-maker" because of
the commissioner's "displayed bias and outrageous conduct."" In
what one commentator described as a "shameless hometown deci-
sion,"'267 an elected Ohio state court judge granted the injunction, con-
cluding that the commissioner had prejudged the plaintiff's actions.2z
Citing no case law authorizing a court to interfere with the commis-
sioner's exercise of his duties,269 the judge temporarily impeded Gia-
matti's ability to exercise his best interests authority.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 247. Rose had also placed bets on games in which he was not person-
ally involved. See id. at 247-48.
261. See id. at 249.
262. See id. at 250.
263. Id. at 251. Though Giamatti signed the letter, he paid very little attention to
the entire matter. Dowd told the commissioner that such letters to sentencing judges
were routine. See Reston, supra note 56, at 286. In essence, Giamatti forfeited to his
private investigator the commissioner's role to judge evidence. See id.
264. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 251-52.
265. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 403.
266. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 252. Rose's attorneys also asked for punitive dam-
ages "against Giamatti in a sum sufficient to punish him for his unfair and outrageous
conduct in the way he has handled from the outset the proceedings against Pete
Rose." Reston, supra note 56, at 296.
267. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 252 (noting that Nadel was up for re-election).
268. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 403 ("We further find that the hearing set for
tomorrow in New York before the commissioner of baseball would be futile and illu-
sory and the outcome a foregone conclusion." (quoting Judge Nadel)).
269. See Will, supra note 2, at 124.
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Incensed by the decision, Giamatti swore to fight the ruling in fed-
eral court.270 He filed a notice of removal, arguing that because the
commissioner's office was an independent body, diversity jurisdiction
existed, enabling the case to be in federal court. 71 In response, Rose
contended that the commissioner's office was a "citizen" in every state
in which a MLB team exists, thus destroying diversity jurisdiction.72
To ascertain appropriate jurisdiction, the federal court believed it had
to determine the "proper parties to [the] action from 'the principal
purpose of the suit."'2 73 Though the court recognized that MLB was a
citizen of Ohio through the presence of the Cincinnati Reds and the
Cleveland Indians, 74 it decided that Rose solely aimed his complaint
at Commissioner Giamatti, and not the Cincinnati Reds or MLB. 75
To reach this conclusion, the court examined and affirmed both the
commissioner's broad powers and the independence of his office. The
court noted that the Major League Agreement granted the commis-
sioner's office "extraordinary power" to investigate acts contrary to
the best interests of baseball.2 76 Within these investigations, the court
recognized that the commissioner had "virtually unlimited authority
to formulate his own rules of procedure. 2 77 Thus, MLB, and the
twenty-six teams that made up MLB at the time, had "absolutely no
control over such an investigation or the manner in which the Com-
missioner conduct[ed] it."'278 The court reasoned that Rose's suit
merely challenged the commissioner's "conduct of the investigation
and disciplinary proceedings in this particular case," and thus held
270. See Reston, supra note 56, at 297 ("The more this kind of thing goes on, the
less inclined I would ever be to consider [removing myself]. I have been challenged in
my own personal self here. I am not inclined to roll over." (quoting Giamatti) (altera-
tion in original)).
271. See Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 3. In arguing for
removal, the commissioner's counsel asserted:
In the state court in Cincinnati, I need not describe Mr. Rose's standing. He
is a local hero, perhaps the first citizen of Cincinnati. And Commissioner
Giamatti is viewed suspiciously as a foreigner from New York, trapped in an
ivory tower, and accused of bias by Mr. Rose. Your Honor, this is a text-
book example of why diversity jurisdiction was created in the Federal Courts
and why it exists to this very day.
Id.
272. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 912-13 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
273. Id. at 913. The court went on to state that "[c]onsequently, the Court must
determine whether, as the Commissioner contends, the citizenship of these defend-
ants should be ignored for the purpose of determining whether the removal of this
case to this Court was proper." Id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 913-22.
276. Id. at 916.
277. Id. ("These rules of procedure are not rules adopted by the members of Major
League Baseball; they are rules promulgated solely by the Commissioner of
Baseball.").
278. Id. at 918; see also id. at 919 ("[lt is clear that with regard to disciplinary
matters, the major league baseball clubs have made the Commissioner totally in-
dependent of their control.").
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that the only defendant needed for the court to afford the plaintiff
complete relief was Commissioner Giamatti.279
With appeals filed in federal court, the public quickly became exas-
perated with the Rose proceedings.' 0 Both sides began to entertain
thoughts of settlement.2s' Giamatti's declining health, along with the
bad press surrounding Rose, forced both sides to strive for a quick
resolution.' On August 23, 1989, just eight days before Giamatti's
death, the Rose matter came to a close.' The parties agreed to put
Rose on MLB's ineligible list, allowing him to apply for reinstatement
in one year.' While on the ineligible list, Rose could not work for
organized baseball in any capacity, including all teams, major or minor
league, and all MLB-recognized broadcast organizations.2ss Rose
could not participate in MLB-sanctioned Old Timer's games, attend
official baseball dinners, or set foot in a team clubhouse or front of-
fice." 6  The settlement agreement, however, made clear that
"[n]othing in this agreement shall be deemed either an admission or a
denial by Peter Edward Rose of the allegation that he bet on any ma-
jor league baseball game."'
At the press conference announcing Rose's suspension, Giamatti
reminded all who were in attendance of the importance of profes-
sional baseball's integrity.' He also reassured the public that he
would maintain his vigilance, vigor, and patience "in protecting the
game from blemish or stain or disgrace." 9 Though Pete Rose had
tarnished and damaged MLB, the game emerged from the situation
just as strong, if not stronger.2m The power of the commissioner's of-
279. Id at 918.
280. See Reston, supra note 56, at 302.
281. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 404 ("Finally, both sides blinked.").
282. See Reston, supra note 56, at 303-04.
283. See id. at 305.
284. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 404.
285. See Reston, supra note 56, at 305.
286. See id
287. Helyar, supra note 6, at 404-05 (quoting the settlement agreement). Immedi-
ately after the announcement of Rose's banishment, Giamatti disregarded this term
of the settlement. A reporter asked the commissioner if he believed Rose had gam-
bled on baseball. In response, Giamatti stated: "In the absence of a hearing and
therefore in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.... I am confronted by the
factual record of the Dowd report. And on the basis of that, yes, I have concluded
that he bet on baseball." Holtzman, supra note 4, at 254 (quoting Giamatti). Giamatti
then asserted that Rose had indeed bet on the Cincinnati Reds. See id. Later in the
day, Rose held a press conference of his own, where he responded to the commis-
sioner's remarks, declaring that "[r]egardless of what the Commissioner said today, I
did not bet on baseball." Id. (quoting Rose).
288. See Giamatti, supra note 1, at 120-21 ("But [baseball], because it is so much a
part of our history as a people and because it has such a purchase on our national
soul, has an obligation to the people for whom it is played-to its fans and well-
wishers-to strive for excellence in all things and to promote the highest ideals.").
289. Id. at 121.
290. See Reston, supra note 56, at 306.
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fice to investigate and discipline had been reaffirmed, and Giamatti
made clear that "no man, no matter how exalted, was above the game
itself." '' Ridding the national pastime of a popular hero in the name
of integrity, morality, and idealism, Giamatti emerged as a national
hero, primed to carry baseball into the 1990s.2g
As for Pete Rose, no American in history had fallen to such great
depths in so short a time, with the possible exception of Richard
Nixon. 93 In 1990, Rose was convicted on two counts of tax evasion,
served five months in a federal prison and paid $50,000 in fines and
$366,042 in back taxes.2 94 In February 1991, in anticipation of Rose's
first year on the ballot, the directors of baseball's Hall of Fame ruled
that no player on MLB's ineligible list could gain entry into Coopers-
town.2 95 To this day, over nine years after his banishment, baseball's
all-time hit leader is still not a member of the Hall of Fame.
E. The NBA and the NFL
The overall success of the commissioner's office in MLB prompted
other professional sports to follow suit. The second commissioner of
the NFL was Bert Bell, whose primary function as commissioner was
to keep the NFL financially afloat.2 96 As late as the 1950s, NFL teams
were still going bankrupt; the idea that the teams could make substan-
tial sums of money only arose at the end of Bell's life.2 97 Bell passed
away in October 1959, after thirteen years of service to the league.298
On January 26, 1960, the National Football League named Pete Ro-
zelle, then the Los Angeles Rams' General Manager, as the league's
third commissioner.2 99 Quickly labeled the "boy czar,"' Rozelle
concentrated his early efforts towards obtaining a league wide televi-
sion contract to maximize league revenues. 30 1 After convincing the
league owners to divide all network television revenue equally, Ro-
zelle negotiated a contract for the 1962 and 1963 seasons with the Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System. Before negotiating the contract, though,
Rozelle had to secure some sort of antitrust exemption that would
291. See id.
292. See id. at 307-08. ("Giamatti had moved onto the level he loved ... where
baseball was not simply a game but a treasured American institution, and he was
more than the baseball commissioner-he was an American leader. He was showing
the leaders of other American institutions that absolute, sincere, passionate stands
were possible.").
293. See Will, supra note 2, at 194 (citing Reston, supra note 56, at 313).
294. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 256.
295. See id.
296. See Harris, supra note 16, at 12-13.
297. See id. at 13.
298. See id. at 11.
299. See id. at 11-12.
300. Id. at 12. Rozelle was only 33 years old when he became commissioner. See id.
at 7.
301. See id. at 12-14.
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allow the league to collectively bargain for, and share the fruits of, a
joint television contract.30 2 On September 30, 1961, in response to
Rozelle's lobbying, Congress enacted the Sports Antitrust Broadcast
Act,3 3 allowing sports leagues to pool and jointly sell their television
rights."° Pete Rozelle retired in 1989 after thirty years in the
league.0 5 Shortly thereafter, the NFL named its chief outside legal
counsel, Paul Tagliabue, as the league's third commissioner.306
Rozelle's television-related efforts prompted the league to grant the
Commissioner "full, complete, and final jurisdiction and authority
[over] any dispute involving a member or members in the League.'"- 7
In the NFL, if the commissioner believes a player's conduct is "detri-
mental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of profes-
sional football," then he must merely send written notice of the
punishment to the player.30  Within twenty days of such notice, the
player or the NFLPA may appeal in writing to the commissioner.?' 9
After the commissioner receives the notice of appeal, he schedules a
hearing at which either he or his designee presides.31 0 The commis-
sioner or his designee then renders a written decision that constitutes
"full, final and complete disposition of the dispute and will be binding
upon the player(s) and Club(s) involved and the parties to this Agree-
ment with respect to that dispute." 311
In the NBA, disciplinary conflicts appeared before the league cre-
ated the commissioner's office. In 1953, the Fort Wayne Pistons se-
lected Jack Molinas in the collegiate draft and signed him to a player
contract.312 In January 1954, after just a few months in the league,
Molinas admitted to placing bets on Pistons games.31 3 Upon hearing
the plaintiffs admission, league president Maurice Podoloff sus-
pended Molinas indefinitely from the NBA for violating anti-gambling
provisions located in both his player contract and the league constitu-
tion.31 4 Although Molinas applied for reinstatement to the league,
302. See id. at 15 (noting that the NFL owners were "[a]pprehensive that such [rev-
enue] sharing might be considered an illegal monopoly under the Sherman Act").
303. Sports Antitrust Broadcast Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as
ameneded at 15 U.S.C. § 1291-95 (1994)).
304. See Harris, supra note 16, at 15 (pointing out that Rozelle was "one of the
better outside operators Capitol Hill had seen in a while").
305. See Will McDonough, The Rozelle Resignation, Boston Globe, March 23, 1989,
Sports, at 1.
306. See Bob Oates, It's Finally Over-NFL Names Boss, LA. Times, Oct. 27,
1989, at C1.
307. NFL Constitution and Bylaws § 8.3, at 17-18 (1988).
308. NFL CBA, supra note 24, art. XI, § 1(a), at 29.
309. See id.
310. See id., art. XI, § 1(c), at 29.
311. Id
312. See Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
313. See iU.
314. See id.
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President Podoloff rejected these attempts, characterizing Molinas as
a "cancer on the league. 315
Molinas then sued both the NBA and Podoloff, arguing that his life-
time ban from, and his lack of reinstatement in, professional basket-
ball for gambling activities constituted a group boycott in violation of
the federal antitrust laws.316 In a short opinion, the court applied a
reasonableness standard to the NBA's disciplinary action:317 unless
Molinas could establish that the discipline was unreasonable, the
league's suspension did not violate the Sherman Act.318 The court de-
termined that a disciplinary rule against gambling seemed "about as
reasonable a rule as could be imagined," '319 and thus held the suspen-
sion and lack of reinstatement justified to effectuate the league's poli-
cies against gambling.32 0 In addition, the court noted that the league's
action was necessary to protect the public's confidence in the game. 32'
Once again, a court showed great deference to the disciplinary deci-
sions of a sports league. Although Podoloff's title was not commis-
sioner, the court gave the league president great latitude to protect
the integrity of professional basketball. As in Milwaukee American
Ass'n v. Landis,322 the judiciary proved unwilling to decide what was
best for a private association, absent any arbitrary or unreasonable
behavior by that association.
In February 1984, the NBA named David Stern, a former partner at
the law firm of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, as the third
315. Id.
316. See id. at 242-43.
317. See id. at 243-44.
318. See id. ("Every league or association must have some reasonable governing
rules, and these rules must necessarily include disciplinary provisions. Surely, every
disciplinary rule which a league may invoke, although by its nature it may involve
some sort of restraint, does not run afoul of the anti-trust laws.").
319. Id. at 244.
320. See id. Molinas argued that because he bet on his own team to win, his con-
duct, though improper, was not immoral. See id. The court believed that the distinc-
tion concerning whether Molinas bet on his own team or not was meaningless: the
problem the mere act of betting on his own team posed was that the wager, or lack
thereof, operated to inform bookmakers as to an insider's opinion concerning the
outcome of a game. See id. Obviously, when Molinas bet on his own team, the book-
makers knew that a team member believed the Pistons would perform well that night.
"Similarly, when he chose not to bet, bookmakers thus would be informed of
[Molinas'] opinion that the Pistons would not perform according to expectations." Id.
Thus, the court concluded that a rule against betting on one's own team was reason-
able, and not violative of the Sherman Act. See id.
321. See id. ("Thus, it was absolutely necessary for the sport to exhume gambling
from its midst for all times in order to survive.").
Ironically, while the Molinas litigation was pending, Molinas was the mastermind of
a nationwide point-shaving scandal in college basketball. See Weiler & Roberts,
Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 33. In the spring of 1961, less than five months
after the resolution of his antitrust suit, Molinas was indicted and then convicted for
his involvement in the national gambling scheme. See id.
322. 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
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commissioner of the league.3" Along with Earvin "Magic" Johnson,
Larry Bird, and Michael Jordan, Stern receives extraordinary credit
for catapulting both the NBA's popularity and profit margins higher
than ever before.324 When Stern entered office, the NBA's discipli-
nary procedure was similar to the NFL's: the commissioner's discipli-
nary decisions were final.? Only recently, in the NBA's 1995 CBA,
did the league and the NBPA agree to alter the grievance mechanism
to allow arbitral review of commissioner disciplinary decisions.2 6
The disciplinary matters discussed in this part evoked a "constitu-
tional" theme that pervades sports and the law: "To what extent
should public law, speaking through judges [and arbitrators], venture
to overturn decisions made by private leagues, speaking through their
commissioners? '327 In the 1920s, baseball's owners envisioned a sys-
tem where commissioners would have the final word on all discipli-
nary issues. As time evolved, however, and sports unions blossomed
and grew in power,3 s the commissioner's best interests authority di-
minished. The MLB and the NBA CBAs now gave outside parties the
power to review commissioner best interests disciplinary decisions.
Whether these outside decision-makers can protect the integrity of
professional sports, however, is doubtful. The next part examines how
the judiciary has handled commissioner disciplinary rulings.
II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO COMMISSIONER "BEST
INTERESTS" RULINGS
Commissioner Kuhn faced two lawsuits in the latter half of the
1970s challenging his authority to discipline members of MLB. This
part reviews these decisions and explores the judiciary's deference to
commissioner rulings.
A. Finley v. Kuhn
In 1960, Charles 0. Finley purchased fifty-two percent of the Kan-
sas City Athletics ("A's") for two million dollars.3 29 In 1968, poor
323. See Armen Keteyian et al., Money Players: Days and Nights Inside the New
NBA 26-27, 34-35 (1997). The first two commissioners of the NBA, Walter Kennedy
and Larry O'Brien, were not the subjects of any major disciplinary disputes, and thus
will not appear in this analysis.
324. Cf id. at 28 (discussing the NBA's "ever-widening profit margin").
325. See Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement to Cases,
Materials and Problems on Sports and the Law 12 (1995) [hereinafter Weiler & Rob-
erts, 1995 Case Supplement].
326. See NBA CBA, supra note 22, art. XXXI, § l(a)-(b), at 163.
327. Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6. at 5.
328. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 96.
329. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 73. As seen in part I, Finley always caused trouble
for the commissioner's office. MLB, however, did have advance notice that Finley
could potentially be a problem. MLB assigned Joe Iglehart, the Orioles' chairman, to
investigate Finley before they approved the A's sale to Finley. In his report to MLB,
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attendance in Kansas City prompted Finley to move the A's to Oak-
land, where he built baseball's first dynasty since the New York
Yankees of the 1950s.331 With a plethora of Finley-recruited young
talent, the A's won each World Series from 1972 to 1974.331 The Mes-
sersmith-McNally arbitration and the coming of free agency, though,
scared Finley.332 In the past, Finley could use the reserve clause to
bully his players into signing low contracts.333 Now, he could only ex-
ercise the options in his players' contracts once, whereupon those
players could sign new contracts with other teams the following
year.3
34
In 1976, Finley used the reserve clause to re-sign Vida Blue, Rollie
Fingers, and Joe Rudi to one-year contracts, all at the maximum
twenty percent pay cut.3 35 Having little interest in losing these three
players at year's end without compensation, Finley began his own per-
sonal assault on free agency. He planned to sell his contractual rights
to Blue, Fingers, and Rudi for cash to obtain the compensation he
believed the free agency system had stolen from him.336 In the begin-
ning of June 1976, Finley began soliciting offers for the three players,
asking one million dollars for each.337 On June 15, the trading dead-
line, Finley sold Vida Blue's contract to the New York Yankees for
one and a half million dollars and sold the contracts of both Rollie
Fingers and Joe Rudi to the Boston Red Sox for one million dollars
each.3 38
News of the sales quickly reached Commissioner Kuhn, who hap-
pened to be in Finley's home city of Chicago attending a White Sox
game.33 9 From the game, Kuhn called Finley at the owner's Chicago
office to inform him the transactions were a "disaster. '340 Finley re-
sponded that the sales were "none of [Kuhn's] damn business," argu-
Iglehart stated that "[u]nder no conditions should this person be allowed into our
league." Id.
330. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 126. Finley privately referred to Kansas City as a
"horseshit town." Helyar, supra note 6, at 74.
331. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 108.
332. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 183.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id. ("Finley aimed to get something for his stars before he lost them to free
agency.").
337. See id. at 184; see also Holtzman, supra note 4, at 179 ("This is Charlie's meat
market. I have several good pieces of meat for sale and the price is a million dollars
apiece." (quoting Finley)).
338. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 171. The Boston Red Sox and the New York
Yankees were, and continue to be, among the wealthier clubs in MLB. See Tom
Haudricourt, The Great Divide: Chasm Getting Wider Between Haves, Have-Nots,
Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Dec. 21, 1998, Sports, at 1 (noting the Yankees and Red Sox
have among the highest payrolls in MLB).
339. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 174.
340. Helyar, supra note 6, at 188.
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ing that commissioners should not meddle in player transaction."4
Already bitter adversaries, 34 Kuhn and Finley arranged to meet im-
mediately at the Pick-Congress Hotel coffee shop on Michigan Ave-
nue.343 At the meeting, Finley expressed concern that he would not
be able to re-sign his players at season's end.34 Finley explained that
if he could sell these players now, he could use the money to sign
younger players and build another dynasty as he had done in the early
1970s.4 Though Kuhn recognized that Finley's arguments were "not
irrational,"3" the commissioner's concern for the welfare of the game
prompted him to evoke his best interests authority to void the sales
three days later.4 7
On June 18, after holding a hearing on the matter, Commissioner
Kuhn called a press conference to announce that he was nullifying the
sales.3" Kuhn reasoned that "[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of
club operations and in baseball would be greatly undermined should
such assignments not be restrained. '3 49 He was concerned that fans in
smaller market cities would lose interest in baseball if rich teams could
simply buy success during the season. 50 Kuhn believed that allowing
the sales to go through would be a precursor to a complete realloca-
tion of talent within MLB from poor teams to rich:
If such transactions now and in the future were permitted, the door
would be opened wide to the buying success of the more affluent
clubs, public suspicion would be aroused, traditional and sound
methods of player development and acquisition would be under-
mined and our efforts to preserve the competitive balance would be
gravely impaired.35'
At his press conference, Kuhn acknowledged that past commissioners
permitted player sales. The commissioner held, however, that Finley's
341. Id
342. See supra notes 176-95 and accompanying text. John Helyar provided further
evidence of Kuhn's and Finley's bitter relationship recounting testimony that Finley
gave at a disciplinary hearing in 1973. Commissioner Kuhn had sent Finley a telegram
requesting Filey's presence at the hearing. During Finley's testimony, MLB's lawyer
asked Finley "[i]sn't it a fact that you told [Kuhn] he could shove that telegram up his
ass?" Finley responded: "No,... [i]t is my recollection I said he could shove it right
up his big, fat ass." Helyar, supra note 6, at 189-90.
343. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 176.
344. See iL (quoting Finley: "Commissioner, I can't sign these guys. They don't
want to play for ol' Charlie. They want to chase those big bucks in New York.").
345. See id.
346. Id. at 177.
347. Norm Miller & Larry Fox, KO Finley $M Deals: Lawsuits Threatened by
Yanks, A's, Daily News (New York, N.Y.), June 19, 1976, at 28.
348. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 178.
349. Id.
350. See generally Helyar, supra note 6, at 193 (noting that at the MLB's executive
council meeting, Dodgers' owner Walter O'Malley stated "[p ennants are not to be
bought"). O'Malley also argued that if a "player auction in June decided pennant
races," no one would attend baseball games. Id.
351. Id. at 194 (quoting Commissioner Kuhn).
19991 1681
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
transactions posed a greater potential for harm than past sales be-
cause of the "present unsettled circumstances of baseball's reserve
system." 352 Kuhn also noted that Finley's "debilitation of the Oakland
[A's]" would betray the team's fans 33
In response, Finley proclaimed that Kuhn was the "village idiot,"
the "nation's idiot," and "his honor, the idiot in charge. '354 One week
later, Finley sued Kuhn for ten million dollars in an Illinois federal
court, challenging the commissioner's authority to disapprove player
transactions.35 5 Finley's complaint alleged that Kuhn, wrongfully de-
priving the A's owner of his rightful money, intended to "injure, dis-
credit, defame, vex, annoy and ultimately to compel the plaintiff to
leave baseball. 356
The trial began on December 16, 1976 and lasted fifteen days.357
The litigation produced 2059 pages of transcript from over twenty wit-
nesses, including Kuhn and Finley.358 Finley testified that it was his
impression upon entering the league that he could buy and sell ball-
players as he pleased.35 9 Finley again argued that the sales would al-
low him to recruit young new talent and build another World Series
champion.36 ° Kuhn's testimony concentrated on the extent and preci-
sion of his powers as commissioner. He explained that the Major
League Agreement did not establish an objective standard to measure
the limits of the commissioner's best interests authority.3 61 As Kuhn
understood the position, the commissioner exists to evaluate what he
personally believed were baseball's best interests and to rule accord-
ingly.362 Kuhn thus acknowledged the unbounded nature of his au-
thority, but contested that the owners consented to this authority
when they signed the Major League Agreement. 63
352. Kuhn, supra note 75, at 178.
353. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1978).
354. Helyar, supra note 6, at 194.
355. See id.
356. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 172. Shortly after Finley filed the lawsuit, MLB
owners voted to indemnify Commissioner Kuhn for personal liability. See id. Ironi-
cally, "[w]in or lose, Finley was on the hook for one-twenty-fourth of Kuhn's court
costs." Id.
357. See id. at 170, 172.
358. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 181.
359. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at 185 ("If I cared to sell a ballplayer or buy a
ballplayer, it was my prerogative, and by the same token if I wished to trade a player
for a player, players and cash, any combination that I wished, I could make it." (quot-
ing Finley)).
360. See id. at 186.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. at 186-87 ("I don't think there is any precise way [to determine the
limits of my power]. It's like the Chancellor's foot; its length is what he finds it to be,
given the equities of the situation." (quoting Kuhn)).
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In a six-page decision, Judge Frank McGarr held for Commissioner
Kuhn and MLB.364 In the decision, the court pointed out that the
extensive publicity surrounding the trial tended "to obscure the rela-
tive simplicity of the legal issues involved. '361 In presenting the sole
legal issue, McGarr stated:
The case is not a Finley-Kuhn popularity contest-though many
fans so view it. Neither is it an appellate judicial review of the wis-
dom of Bowie Kuhn's action. The question before the court is not
whether Bowie Kuhn was wise to do what he did, but rather
whether he had the authority.366
To resolve this issue, McGarr examined the intent of MLB's owners in
signing the Major League Agreement and determined that they
granted the commissioner broad powers to "prevent any conduct de-
structive of the confidence of the public in the integrity of base-
ball.' ' 367 Believing that Kuhn acted within the realm of this grant,
McGarr ruled in favor of the Commissioner.3 s
Describing the decision as "eighteen years of blood, sweat and sac-
rifice down the drain," Finley immediately appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.36 9 On appeal, Finley argued that Kuhn's actions were "arbi-
trary, capricious, unreasonable, discriminatory, directly contrary to
historical precedent, baseball tradition, and prior rulings and actions
of the Commissioner. '' 370 Finley also claimed that Kuhn's actions
were "procedurally unfair," because the A's had no warning that
transactions such as these were not in the best interests of baseball.371
The Seventh Circuit framed the issue as whether the Commissioner
was "contractually authorized to disapprove player assignments which
he finds to be 'not in the best interests of baseball' where neither
moral turpitude nor violation of a Major League Rule is involved."' 7
To ascertain the owners' original intent in signing the Major League
Agreement, the court examined the history of commissioner author-
ity, dating back to Judge Landis.3 73 The court noted that upon Lan-
dis's death in 1944, MLB amended the Major League Agreement in
364. See id at 188-90.
365. See id- at 188.
366. Abrams, supra note 17, at 111.
367. Holtzman, supra note 4, at 189.
368. Kuhn's reaction was favorable: "Thiis [decision] takes the shadow away from
the question of the commissioner's powers.... It's much clearer now that the com-
missioner was intended to be able to step into a situation and say, 'No, you can't do
that because it would be bad for the game."' Nancy Scannell, Judge Rules Kuhn Had
Right to Nullify Sales by Finley; Judge Rules for Kuhn in Baseball Dispute, Wash. Post,
Mar. 18, 1977, at D1.
369. Kuhn, supra note 75, at 182 (quoting Finley).
370. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Finley's complaint).
371. See id. at 537.
372. Id at 530.
373. See id. at 532-34.
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two respects to limit the commissioner's authority.374 First, the parties
eliminated the portion of the "Pledge of Loyalty" which had waived
their right of recourse to the courts.375 Second, the owners added a
provision stating that "no action or procedure taken in compliance
with any such Major League Rule ... shall be considered or construed
to be detrimental to Baseball. 3 76 The two amendments had remained
in effect through the terms of Happy Chandler and Ford Frick.37 7
Upon Frick's retirement in 1964, and in accordance with his recom-
mendation, the owners eliminated the two amendments.378 These
amendments were revealing to the court, for they indicated that if
MLB intended to limit the commissioner's authority, the owners fully
"knew how to do so." 379
With the original provisions of the original agreement almost en-
tirely intact, the court found that MLB granted the Commissioner
"broad power in unambiguous language to investigate any act, trans-
action or practice not in the best interests of baseball, to determine
what preventive, remedial or punitive action is appropriate in the
premises, and to take that action. ' 380 The court then noted that
"[s]tandards such as the best interests of baseball, the interests of the
morale of the players and the honor of the game, or 'sportsmanship
which accepts the umpire's decision without complaint,' are not neces-
sarily familiar to courts and obviously require some expertise in their
application."' 381 The court thus determined that only the commis-
sioner, appointed to practice this expertise, should interpret the rules
and best interests of baseball:382 "While it is true that professional
baseball selected as its first Commissioner a federal judge, it intended
only him and not the judiciary as a whole to be its umpire and
governor.,383
374. See id. at 534.
375. See id.
376. Id. In its entirety, the rule stated: "No Major League Rule or other joint
action of the two Major Leagues, and no action or procedure taken in compliance
with any such Major League Rule or joint action of the two Major Leagues shall be
considered or construed to be detrimental to Baseball." Id.
377. See id.
378. See id. The owners also changed the language "detrimental to the best inter-
ests of baseball" to "not in the best interests of the national game of Baseball" or "not
in the best interests of Baseball." Id.
379. Id. at 537
380. Id. at 534.
381. Id. at 537.
382. See id. at 539.
383. Id. at 537 (emphasis added). Finley also argued that MLB limited the commis-
sioner's bests interests authority to acts which either violated the Major League Rules
or involved moral turpitude. See id. As stated in the text, the court pointed out that if
MLB intended to limit the commissioner's authority as such, the 1944 amendments
demonstrated that "it knew how to do so." Id. For a discussion of the 1944 amend-
ments to the Major League Agreement, see supra notes 374-79 and accompanying
text.
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The court also dismissed Finley's unjust procedure argument, where
the A's owner claimed the Commissioner acted without giving no-
tice.3 4 The court concluded that the Major League Agreement, in
and of itself, put the owners on notice of the Commissioner's ability to
act in any manner he saw fit to police the game's best interests.385
Further, the court observed that the Commissioner provided a notice
of hearing, held the hearing, and provided Finley with a written
decision.386
Ultimately, unless Finley could prove that Kuhn's ruling was either
arbitrary, capricious, or not made in good faith, the court would not
second-guess the commissioner's judgment.3" Finding that the Com-
missioner had acted in good faith, the Seventh Circuit agreed with
Judge McGarr that "whether [the Commissioner] was right or wrong
is beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of this court to de-
cide.' '3 1 In this first lawsuit challenging commissioner authority since
1931, the court reaffirmed the judiciary's deference to baseball's inter-
nal governance system: 389 "[A]s long as... the commissioner of base-
ball, [sic] followed the procedures set forth in the charter, his
judgment would not be disturbed in court."3"
B. Atlanta National League Baseball Club v. Kuhn
After 1975's Messersmith-McNally arbitration,39' the MLBPA and
management representatives met to negotiate a new collective bar-
gaining agreement, taking into account the new system of free
In response to Finley's argument that Kuhn's actions repudiated past tradition, the
court recognized that the unstable condition of the reserve clause allowed Kuhn sub-
stantial leeway in determining baseball's best interests. See id. at 536-37 ("No one
could predict then or now with certainty that Oakland would fare better or worse
relative to other clubs through the vagaries of the revised reserve system occurring
entirely apart from any action by the Commissioner.").
384. See id. at 540.
385. See id. ("[A]nyone becoming a signatory to the Major League Agreement was
put on ample notice that the action ultimately taken by the Commissioner was not
only possible but probable.").
386. See id. at 540 n.45.
387. Cf. id. at 539 n.44 ("There is insufficient evidence, however, to support plain-
tiff's allegation that the Commissioner's action was arbitrary or capricious, or moti-
vated by malice, ill will or anything other than the Commissioner's good faith
judgment that these attempted assignments were not in the best interests of baseball."
(quoting the district court's finding of facts)).
388. Id. at 539 (footnote omitted). The court also noted that the waiver of recourse
clause in the Major League Agreement was a "manifestation of the intent of the con-
tracting parties to insulate from review decisions made by the Commissioner concern-
ing the subject matter of actions taken in accordance with his grant of powers." Id. at
543.
389. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 113.
390. Id. Finley appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied a writ of certiorari.
Finley v. Kuhn, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
391. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
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agency.39 Within the CBA, the parties agreed to create a special No-
vember re-entry draft for those players filing for free agency.3 93 At
this draft, however, up to twelve teams would be able to obtain the
negotiation rights to a free agent.394 From the last day of the season
until three days before the draft, however, only the team of record
(the player's team that previous season) could negotiate with the free
agent.395 During this post-season period, other clubs were permitted
to "talk with the free agent or his representative about the merits of
contracting with a particular team, 'provided, however, that the Club
and the free agent shall not negotiate terms of contract with each
other.' ' 396 To help ensure that teams adhered to these "tampering"
rules, Commissioner Kuhn issued a series of directives to each major
league club in 1976 explaining the rule's provisions and warning
would-be rule-breakers of the potential ramifications. 97
In 1976, a frequent rule-breaker, Robert Edward ("Ted") Turner
III, bought control of the Atlanta Braves from Bill Bartholomay.398
Though Turner was the owner of a television station, the Braves were
his first "high-profile" acquisition.399 Upon entering the league, Tur-
ner had a maverick reputation, labeled an "incurable romantic," an
"incorrigible carouser," and a "hyperactive child."40 In addition, Tur-
ner knew very little about sports other than sailing.4"1 Fueled by a
love of competition and a flair for the unexpected, Turner was excited
392. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1215
(N.D. Ga. 1977).
393. See id.
394. See id.
395. See id. The rule's purpose was to give "the clubs of record... the maximum
opportunity to retain their prospective free agents in an effort to preserve a competi-
tive balance among the clubs in professional baseball." Id.
396. Id. (quoting MLB's Basic Agreement).
397. See id. at 1215-16. Kuhn issued his first directive on August 27, 1976, His
second, issued on September 28 of the same year, spelled out what conduct would be
considered tampering. See id. at 1216. The commissioner warned that the CBA did
not permit contact with a player during the season about the potential of signing a
new contract after the season, unless the team making the contact was the team of
record. See id. The commissioner also pointed out that indirect contact during or
after the season, such as conversations with either a player's representative or other
third party intermediary, or public comments indicating an interest in a player were
illegal. See id. The third warning, issued in October, stated that "[p]ossible penalties
will include fines, loss of rights under [amateur free agent] and re-entry drafts and
suspension of those responsible." Id. (alterations in original).
398. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 259.
399. Id.
400. Helyar, supra note 6, at 177-78. In his sophomore year at Brown University,
school officials suspended Turner for his part in a "drunken fracas." Id. at 177. Brown
University eventually expelled Turner from school "for entertaining a woman in his
room." Id. In response to the expulsion, Turner's father told his son: "I think you are
rapidly becoming a jackass." Id.
401. See id. at 178. Thrner was a skilled yachtsman, participating in his first
America's Cup in 1974. See id.
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to enter the world of baseball. 4 2 His eagerness to compete, however,
quickly landed him and his team in trouble. In his first season in the
league, he became enthralled with a young outfielder on the San Fran-
cisco Giants, Gary Matthews.40 3 During the season, John Alevizos,
the Braves' General Manager, twice contacted Matthews about the
possibility of signing with the Braves after the season.' 4 In Septem-
ber 1976, Commissioner Kuhn fined the Atlanta Braves $10,000 for
Alevizos's tampering."° Kuhn believed that the fine's impact should
have "foreclosed any further problems as to Matthews," but he was
sorely mistaken.4 6
Rain washed out the fourth game of the 1976 World Series between
the New York Yankees and the Cincinnati Reds. In lieu of the post-
poned game, baseball's hierarchy retreated to the Americana Hotel in
New York for a late-night cocktail party.4"7 Slightly inebriated, Tur-
ner approached Giants' owner Bob Lurie to scoff at him for his over-
reaction to the Matthews tampering.408 In his "usual hundred-decibel
voice," Turner informed Lurie: "I'll do everything I can to get Gary
Matthews." 9 Turner revealed his plans to post a billboard outside
the Atlanta airport welcoming Gary Matthews 10 and to hold a "gala
celebration" in his honor.41' Turner also told the Giants' owner:
"Whatever you offer him,. . . I plan to pay him double. In fact, I have
offered him twice as much as your attendance was last year. Let's see,
that was about 630,000 or so. Well, he can count on that much to play
for us."' 4 12 The next morning, newspapers throughout the country
published Turner's tirade.4"3 Lurie quickly filed tampering charges
with the league office.414
402. See id at 180, 182. Turner revealed his excitement on Opening Day when he
led the crowd in a pre-game singing of "Take Me Out to the Ballgame," and later
jumped out of the stands to congratulate the Braves' Ken Henderson on a first-inning
home run. See id. at 181.
403. See id at 198.
404. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 259.
405. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-17 (N.D.
Ga. 1977).
406. Kuhn, supra note 75, at 259.
407. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 198.
408. See i. at 199.
409. Id.
410. See id.
411. See id. ("The major celebrities from Atlanta are gonna be present. So is the
mayor and the governor." (quoting Turner)).
412. Id.
413. See id. Turner's harangue would give Gary Matthews great bargaining lever-
age against the Giants. If he knew he would receive a certain amount of dollars from
the Braves, he would have little reason to accept less from San Francisco. See Kuhn,
supra note 75, at 259 ("Ted's comments not only were a clear violation of our tamper-
ing rule but also made it virtually impossible for Lurie to sign Matthews."). This
disadvantage to the team of record was the precise reason for the tampering rule's
enactment. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
414. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 259.
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At the re-entry draft, Turner drafted the negotiation rights to Mat-
thews and subsequently signed him to a five-year, $1.2 million dollar
contract.415 On the day of the draft, Kuhn held a formal hearing to
decipher what had occurred at the New York cocktail party.41 6 Turner
blamed his comments on the alcohol and begged Kuhn for forgive-
ness.417 One month later, during MLB's annual meetings, Turner con-
tinued to plead his case, shifting the blame for his behavior from the
alcohol to his lack of experience in baseball.418 Turner then implored
the commissioner to exact punishment only on him and not on
Matthews.419
On December 30, 1976, Commissioner Kuhn suspended Turner for
one year from MLB, but allowed Matthews to stay with the Braves.420
Citing the gravity of the double tampering violation, Kuhn also de-
prived the Braves of their first round draft pick in the June 1977 ama-
teur draft.42' In response, Turner asked for and received another
hearing to make one final attempt to avoid the suspension. 42 During
the hearing, Atlanta civic leaders explained Turner's great importance
to the Atlanta community and cautioned that his removal would
"dampen the baseball spirit of the city. '' 423 Ultimately, Turner
pleaded for sympathy, imploring the Commissioner for a shorter pun-
ishment.42 4 Although Kuhn found Turner's performance entertain-
415. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 212.
416. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 260.
417. See id.
418. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 213 ("This was my first year in baseball, and I
didn't know very much about it when I came into it. I've been trying to learn and I've
been trying to be a good citizen. I needed the help of you and the other leaders to tell
me what it is you want me to do." (quoting Turner)).
419. See id. at 212-13 ("C'mon, Principal [(Turner's nickname for Kuhn)], you can't
take me seriously when I've had a few drinks. But no matter what, you can't take
Gary away from me.... Take it out on me! Fine me, suspend me, do anything, but
don't take away Gary!" (quoting Turner)).
One school of thought held that Turner wanted to be suspended from baseball for
the Matthews incident. See id. at 212. Throughout his first year owning the Braves,
Turner had become a popular icon in Atlanta. See id. The next summer, however,
Turner planned on racing in the America's Cup and needed an excuse to take a leave
of absence from his ownership duties, without appearing as if he had more interest in
sailing. See id. "How would he explain that he cared more about a yacht race than a
pennant race? Where would his 'man of the people' image be then?" Id. By impos-
ing a suspension, Bowie Kuhn could solve this problem. See id.
420. See id. at 213. Kuhn found that Turner's "statements clearly had the effect of
subverting the collective bargaining agreement and the re-entry draft procedures
adopted pursuant to it. I am therefore compelled to find that they were not in the
best interests of Baseball ...." Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F.
Supp. 1213, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 1977). The commissioner allowed Matthews's contract to
stand because of "the urgings of Turner and upon the Commissioner's conclusion that
Matthews had not engaged in any improper contact." Id.
421. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 260.
422. See id.
423. Id.
424. See id. at 260-61.
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ing,425 the Commissioner noted that it was "[m]issing ... any
explanation of how [he] was to ignore successive tamperings by the
same club with the same player, especially when [he] had warned after
the first tampering that the Braves were running the risk of suspension
if there was a repeat violation. '426 Kuhn confirmed the one-year sus-
pension, prompting Turner to sue the Commissioner in federal court
in Atlanta.427
Judge Newell Edenfield presided over Atlanta National League
Baseball Club v. Kuhn4"s for a two-day trial in April 1977.429 In a
decision that Kuhn described as "a ninety-five percent victory," the
court upheld the Commissioner's power to suspend Turner, but abro-
gated Kuhn's seizure of the Braves' first round draft pick.4' 3 Like the
court in Finley v. Kuhn,43' Edenfield commenced his analysis by ex-
amining the commissioner's authority under the Major League Agree-
ment.432 The court concluded that "[t]o the extent this case involves a
violation of the Major League Agreement, the court has no hesitation
in saying that the defendant Commissioner had ample authority to
punish [the] plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best
interests of baseball. '43 3 The fact that the broken rule appeared in the
CBA troubled the judge, for the Major League Agreement, and not
the CBA, served as the source of the commissioner's authority.434
Judge Edenfield found, however, that nothing in the CBA prevented
Kuhn "from concluding that conduct which he views as violating the
Collective Bargaining Agreement is also not in the best interests of
baseball. 435 Further, the court held that the judiciary was in no posi-
tion to question the wisdom of the decision: "What conduct is 'not in
the best interests of baseball' is, of course, a question which addresses
itself to the Commissioner, not this court. 4 36 As, according to the
court, Kuhn's decision was not a result of ill will or bias, it held the
decision was not arbitrary or capricious.437 The Commissioner, there-
425. Turner beseeched the Commissioner. "I would get down on the floor and let
you jump up and down on me if it would help.... I would bend over and let you
paddle my behind, hit me over the head with a Fresca bottle, something like that.
Physical pain I can stand." Id. at 261.
426. 1l at 261-62.
427. See id at 262.
428. 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1214 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
429. Judge Edenfield "chided Judge McGarr for stretching the Finley proceedings
to two weeks." Holtzman, supra note 4, at 192.
430. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, 432 F. Supp. at 1225.
431. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
432. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, 432 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
433. Id at 1220.
434. See id ("The question which makes the case confusing and difficult, however,
is to what extent the Major League Agreement applies here.").
435. Id. at 1221.
436. Id at 1222.
437. See id
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fore, had the authority to punish Turner for his tampering
violations.4 3
The court then examined the sanctions Kuhn imposed.4 39 Turner
argued that his one-year suspension was an abuse of Kuhn's discre-
tion,4 ° deeming that the "punishment [did not] fit the crime. '4 41 Af-
ter analyzing the circumstances, however, Judge Edenfield determined
that the Commissioner could easily have concluded that multiple tam-
pering violations concerning the same player required harsh disci-
pline." 2 The court recognized that "honest minds could, and indeed
do, disagree as to what is an appropriate punishment. The court,
therefore, simply [could] not say the Commissioner abused his discre-
tion."" 3 Noting that the owners clearly intended to give the commis-
sioner great discretion as to what sanction was appropriate, the court
held that ceaseless judicial review of commissioner-imposed punish-
ments would be completely impractical and run counter to the inten-
tions of the Major League Agreement. 4 4 Thus, the court upheld the
imposition and length of the suspension.445 Judge Edenfield, how-
ever, held that the Major League Agreement did not give Commis-
sioner Kuhn the authority to revoke Atlanta's first round draft pick
for the amateur draft." 6
As cases such as Finley and Atlanta National League Baseball Club
demonstrate, the judiciary has granted wide authority to commission-
ers acting within the purview of their sport's operating agreements. In
this respect, sports leagues are like private clubs, whose members may
dictate the club's rules and procedures through those operating agree-
ments.4 7 As long as a league's commissioner acted in accordance
with the guidelines set forth in that agreement, courts have not inter-
438. See id.
439. See id. at 1222-26.
440. See id. at 1223.
441. Kuhn, supra note 75, at 262 (quoting Turner).
442. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, 432 F. Supp. at 1223.
443. Id.
444. See id. ("Judicial review of every sanction imposed by the Commissioner
would produce an unworkable system that the Major League Agreement endeavors
to prevent.").
445. See id. ("Here, Turner was warned of the suspension, he asked for the suspen-
sion, the contract specifically authorized it, and he got it.").
In 1977, Ted Turner won the right to represent the United States in sailing in the
America's Cup and defeated the Australian challenger in the Cup's final match-up.
See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 262-63. During his suspension, Turner's behavior was
exemplary, prompting him to approach the Commissioner to plead for an early termi-
nation of the penalty. See id. at 263. After weighing several factors, Kuhn lifted Tur-
ner's suspension prior to 1978's spring training. See id. at 263-64.
446. See Atlanta Nat'l Baseball Club, 432 F. Supp. at 1223-26. Commissioner Kuhn
contemplated appealing Judge Edenfield's ruling as to the draft pick, but determined
that the suspension was adequate punishment for Turner's offense. See Kuhn, supra
note 75, at 262 ("I thought [Judge Edenfield] was on thin judicial ice in returning the
draft pick to the Braves. Still, we had won the main show .. .
447. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 113.
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fered with the commissioner's decisions, absent any arbitrary or capri-
cious actions.' 8
With the assistance of two maverick owners, Charles Finley and Ted
Turner, courts reaffirmed commissioners' authority to discipline own-
ership under the best interests clauses of league operating agreements.
Commissioner Kuhn believed that "the dominance of the commis-
sioner was firmly in place as it had not been since the days of Judge
Landis."" 9 Moreover, in the 1989 Rose case, the judiciary again con-
firmed commissioner power to investigate and discipline acts contrary
to the best interests of baseball.4"' Courts have recognized that, just
as in the days of Landis, sports leagues appoint commissioners to pre-
serve the integrity of professional sports by acting in a league's best
interests.45 ' Faced with the rationale behind these appointments,
courts have wisely refused to substitute their judgments for those of
league commissioners.
Arbitrators, however, have not adopted this judicial deference to
commissioner rulings. Empowered by CBAs to review commissioner
disciplinary decisions by CBAs, arbitrators often substitute their judg-
ment as to discipline for the commissioner's, sometimes in apparent
derogation of CBA-mandated standards of limited review. The next
part scrutinizes two arbitration awards from the 1990s and concludes
that the arbitrator's lack of deference to commissioner authority dam-
ages the integrity of professional baseball and basketball, respectively.
III. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION OF COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE
As discussed above, the present NBA and MLB CBAs allow their
players unions to appeal commissioner-imposed discipline to griev-
ance arbitrators.45" A basic tenet of alternative dispute resolution is
that arbitrators are not bound by judicial precedent.5 3 Thus, the
cases discussed to this point of the Note can have as much or as little
bearing on an arbitration as a grievance arbitrator wants. This part
dissects two grievance arbitrations where players challenged commis-
sioner-imposed discipline. This part argues that arbitrators too often
merely substitute their own judgment as to a sports league's best inter-
ests for the league commissioner's judgment, rather than reviewing
commissioner-imposed discipline under the appropriate standards of
review.
448. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
449. Kuhn, supra note 75, at 262.
450. See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
452. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
453. See Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation,
and Other Processes 216 (2d ed. 1992) ("[A]rbitrators are not generally required to
follow the law, and a failure to do so does not constitute grounds, under the [Federal
Arbitration Act), for vacating the arbitrator's award.").
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A. The Steve Howe Arbitration
Steve Howe was the 1980 National League Rookie of the Year.454
In 1981, he played a vital role in the Los Angeles Dodgers' World
Series victory over the New York Yankees.455 In November 1982, the
Dodger pitcher voluntarily entered a five-week drug rehabilitation
program.456 Just five months after his release, he resumed treatment
at another hospital for drug rehabilitation." 7 The pitcher rejoined the
Dodgers on June 29, but encountered trouble again in September
when he missed a team flight to Atlanta and later refused to submit to
a drug test.45 8 The Dodgers suspended Howe, and he headed back to
drug rehabilitation.459
In response to these events, on December 15, 1983, Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn suspended Steve Howe for the entire 1984 season.460 Al-
together, between 1982 and 1988, either the Dodgers or the commis-
sioner's office suspended Howe on six separate occasions. After his
sixth offense in 1988, MLB suspended Howe for life for violating his
drug aftercare program. 6' In 1990, Howe made a personal plea to
Commissioner Fay Vincent to give the pitcher "one last chance. "462
After the MLBPA filed a grievance requesting Howe's return, Com-
missioner Vincent reinstated the six-time drug offender with certain
conditions.463 Aware that Howe was in need of a stringent aftercare
program, Vincent contemplated testing Howe three times a week for
the remainder of his career. 4" If any drug test turned up positive,
Vincent made it clear that Howe would never return to MLB 65
Though Vincent never formally approved or implemented such a drug
testing program, Howe submitted to drug tests over the next two years
on a "frequent, although irregular, basis. 466
In 1991, Howe played for the New York Yankees and had a success-
ful season.467 After the season, he signed a new contract with the
Yankees that, with incentives, tallied $2.3 million.468 In December
1991, however, Howe was arrested in his off-season home of Kalispell,
454. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 309.
455. See id.
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. See id. at 309-10.
459. See id. at 310.
460. See id.
461. See Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 4.
462. Joel Sherman, Commish to Howe: Strike 7, You're Out, N.Y. Post, June 25,
1992, at 64.
463. See Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 4-5.
464. See id. at 5.
465. See id.
466. Id.
467. On the Yankees, Howe was a relief pitcher and finished the 1991 season with a
3-1 win-loss record and a 1.68 earned run average. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 498.
468. See Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 5.
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Montana and charged with two misdemeanors: attempting to
purchase cocaine and possession of cocaine.469 Although Howe ac-
knowledged he attempted to purchase the cocaine, his plea bargain
required that he only enter an Afford plea, whereby he accepted guilt
without actually pleading guilty.470 In response to Howe's seventh
drug infraction, however, Commissioner Vincent declared that "Steve
Howe has finally extinguished his opportunity to play" in MLB, and
suspended the Yankee relief pitcher for life.471
The MLBPA quickly filed a grievance before baseball's arbitrator,
George Nicolau, challenging Vincent's imposition of the lifetime
ban.4 72 The union conceded that Howe was guilty of possession, but
urged that a lifetime suspension for attempted possession of cocaine
was too severe.473 Though Howe admittedly had "the longest discipli-
nary record of drug abuse offenses in the history of Baseball," 74 the
union cited Howe's clean testing record in the time since his last sus-
pension as indicative of his progress.475 The union's chief argument
revolved around the fact that Howe suffered from adult attention defi-
cit disorder ("ADD").476 According to the union, a new medical the-
ory linked ADD and cocaine addiction.4" Thus, the union argued
that these medical factors should be relevant in reviewing the propri-
ety of the commissioner's ruling.478 Arbitrator Nicolau held a hearing
on the Howe matter on June 30, 1992.179 Four months later, Nicolau
finally made his decision, reinstating Howe to MLB after he spent 119
days on the ineligible list." °
Before proceeding with his analysis, Nicolau had to determine the
appropriate standard of review to apply to the commissioner's discipli-
nary decision. At the time of the Howe arbitration, Article XII, Sec-
tion A of baseball's CBA allowed the grievance arbitrator to overturn
commissioner-imposed discipline if the arbitrator found no "just
cause" for the punishment.48' Nicolau determined that "[wJhile the
Commissioner has a 'reasonable range of discretion' in such matters,
the penalty he imposes in a particular case must be 'reasonably com-
469. See Sherman, supra note 462, at 64.
470. See id.
471. Id.
472. See id.
473. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 498. Howe was the first player ever to receive a
lifetime suspension for violating MLB's substance abuse policy. See Sherman, supra
note 462, at 64.
474. Sherman, supra note 462, at 64 (quoting Commissioner Vincent).
475. See Helyar, supra note 6, at 498.
476. See iU.
477. See id.
478. See id.
479. See id.
480. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Commissioner of Major League
Baseball (1992) (Nicolau, Arb.) [hereinafter Howe Arbitration], reprinted in Weiler &
Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 4, 10.
481. See Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 11-12.
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mensurate with the offense' and 'appropriate, given all the circum-
stances.' ''482 Thus, the issue in the Howe Arbitration was whether,
given all the circumstances, Commissioner Vincent had just cause to
banish a seven-time drug offender from professional baseball.
Nicolau next stated his belief that the commissioner of a sports
league has a higher burden than a normal employer in justifying alifetime ban.483 MLB's counsel had argued that the commissioner was
simply an employer who dismissed an employee for breaking the rules
of employment. 48  Nicolau disagreed with this analogy, explaining
that the "Commissioner's imposition of Baseball's 'ultimate sanction,
lifetime ineligibility' means that no employer in Baseball may hire
Howe. 485 The burden on the commissioner to defend his actions,
therefore, "transcends that of the ordinary employer inasmuch as he
can effectively prevent a player's employment by anyone at any level
of his chosen profession."486
Nicolau purported to recognize baseball's interest and need to erad-
icate drug use among its players.487 Nicolau believed, however, thatMLB's interest in deterrence had to be considered in light of Howe'sindividual circumstances, especially his psychiatric illness. 488 UponHowe's return to baseball after his sixth suspension, Commissioner
Vincent hired a medical advisor to examine Howe's health and deter-
mine what Howe needed to remain drug-free. 489 According to Nico-lau, "[i]t was clear from [the doctor's] report that in his expert view
continuous testing, including testing in the off-season, was essential ifHowe was to succeed in resisting drugs during his career while also
seeking to overcome his addiction through therapeutic means. '490
482. Howe Arbitration, supra note 480, (quoting Nixon (Panel Decision 84, (1992)(Nicolau, Arb.)), reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note
325, at 5.
483. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 6.
484. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 6.
485. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 6.486. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 6.Here, Nicolau's argument is not completely accurate; semi-professional leagues existthat are not affiliated with Major League Baseball. See Jeff McLauglin, Brockton Con-
siders Pitching a Minor League Stadium, Boston Globe, Jan. 10, 1999, South Weekly,
at 13 (recognizing independent baseball leagues that have "no formal links to the
major leagues"). One such league, the Northern League, gained notoriety when in1996, the St. Paul Saints signed former New York Met Darryl Strawberry. See ChuckJohnson, Strawberry will Sign with Saints, USA Today, May 3, 1996, at 6C.487. See Howe Arbitration, supra note 480, reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 6.488. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 7.
489. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 7.
490. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 7.Dr. Riordan, the commissioner-hired medical examiner, "cautioned against Howe's
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Nicolau repeatedly cited MLB's inability to design and implement a
testing plan for Howe as a primary cause of Howe's subsequent drug
infraction.49 Consequently, Nicolau held that "[t]o give Howe 'yet
another chance' of returning to the game without implementing [test-
ing] conditions was not... a fair shot at success. 492
Nicolau noted that Commissioner Vincent gave little consideration
to Howe's medical records before rendering a decision after his sev-
enth drug infraction.493 Nicolau believed that Vincent should have
probed beneath the surface of Howe's medical records to ascertain if
Howe's diagnosis and treatment were proper.494 To Nicolau's chagrin,
Commissioner Vincent considered "medical matters of little impor-
tance when measured against Baseball's interests.."495 Nicolau was not
convinced that Vincent could make a just decision without considering
all the factors relative to Howe's disease.496
Next, the arbitrator addressed the Commissioner's concern that
MLB needed to deter drug use by other players. Vincent argued that
a less severe sanction would fail to deter future drug use, for players
would know that re-entry into the league was virtually automatic 4 9'
According to Nicolau, however, drug use in MLB was on the decline,
and he believed that "this steady progress toward a drug free environ-
ment [was] quite likely to continue."4 9 Nicolau then expressed his
belief that "[n]o member of the public can seriously contend ... that
the manner in which the industry and the Association have previously
dealt with the problem has imperiled the integrity of the game. '' 419
The arbitrator concluded that "[d]eterrence, however laudable an ob-
return unless he was tested every other day of the year throughout his professional
career ... ." Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note
325, at 7.
491. See id, reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 7 ("But the stringent, year-round testing requirement, as we have seen, was not
implemented and Howe was unfortunately set on a course without the strategic safe-
guard Dr. Riordan considered indispensable to his success.").
492. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 8.
493. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 8.
494. See idj, reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 8.
495. Id (emphasis added), reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement,
supra note 325, at 8.
496. See id ("When considering the permanent expulsion of a player, this failure to
examine all the circumstances, irrespective of the cause, is not, in my view, consistent
with his responsibility."), reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra
note 325, at 9.
497. See id. ("[A] less severe sanction would have sent the wrong message to play-
ers who will view anything short of a lifetime ban as a license to take up and repeat-
edly use drugs."), reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note
325, at 9.
498. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 9.
499. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 9.
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jective, should not be achieved at the expense of fairness. ' '5 ° The
above factors prompted Nicolau to hold that Commissioner Vincent's
lifetime suspension of Steve Howe, a seven-time drug offender, was
without just cause.
Though Commissioner Vincent resigned from MLB in September
1992,5°1 his reaction to the November arbitration award was harsh.
Vincent stated:
It's like saying you've had seven chances, but eight is the right
number. How can there be soundness in that judgment? That
makes the whole thing a joke. Nicolau is saying he's giving him one
more chance. Well, I did that in '89. What if a medical theory
comes up after the next violation? It could excuse the next viola-
tion? Then there would be more chances. It's a daisy chain. You
never get to the end of it.502
He added that "[i]t makes baseball look silly .... I don't think there
was any doubt about my having just cause. I think the arbitrator sub-
stituted his judgment for mine, and the arbitrator was wrong. 503
Players also doubted the wisdom of Nicolau's decision. Rich Montele-
one, a former teammate of Howe's on the Yankees, pronounced "as
far as having rules, there is a point something has to stop. That goes
for players, lawyers, writers. You have rules, and if you break the
rules, you have to pay the consequences. 50 4
The disturbing aspect of Nicolau's decision in the Steve Howe arbi-
tration was the unilateral imposition of the arbitrator's views concern-
ing the integrity and best interests of baseball. Nicolau's exposure to
the world of baseball was limited to testimony in arbitration hearings
and possibly the knowledge derived from being a baseball fan. De-
spite this limited exposure, he felt able to declare that no member of
the public could possibly think "that the manner in which the industry
and the Association have previously dealt with the [drug] problem has
imperiled the integrity of the game."505 Nicolau, however, failed to
properly identify what MLB perceived to be damaging to the integrity
of baseball. The above quote makes it clear that Nicolau believed the
manner in which Commissioner Vincent disciplined drug offenders
implicated the integrity of the game." 6 Although he was partially cor-
rect, Nicolau missed the bigger picture. Drug abuse itself is cata-
500. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 9.
501. See Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 27.
502. Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, Sports and the Law, supra note 325,
at 11.
503. Howe Suspension Ends with Reinstatement, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 1992, at C3
(quoting Commissioner Vincent).
504. Sherman, supra note 462, at 64.
505. Howe Arbitration, supra note 480, reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case
Supplement, supra note 325, at 9.
506. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 9.
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strophically destructive of the game's integrity and the public's
confidence in baseball. 7 Commissioner Vincent calculated this dam-
age to baseball's integrity and determined that Howe's suspension was
necessary to deter future drug use by other players.' 8 Vincent was
not concerned that MLB's handling of drug infractions would imperil
the game's integrity-athletes who fail to perform their best in con-
tests that fans pay to attend destroy the game's integrity. Nicolau's
failure to recognize this larger issue is illustrative of why only a sport's
commissioner should officially evaluate the integrity of his sport.5 19
Vincent's allegedly deficient investigation of Howe's medical
records also troubled Nicolau, causing the arbitrator to accuse the
commissioner of considering "medical matters of little importance
when measured against Baseball's interests. 5 1 0  As stated above,
MLB created the commissioner's office to protect the sport's integrity
and to maintain its best interests. It was not Commissioner Vincent's
responsibility to provide the optimal circumstances for Steve Howe to
recover from a drug addiction. Steve Howe's problem was far larger
than the game itself.51' The Major League Agreement charged Com-
missioner Vincent with the responsibility of shielding baseball from
influences damaging to the game's best interests, not with surveying
the health of drug addicts. Thus, sports commissioners should primar-
ily consider their sports' interests. Doctors should consider medical
matters. If Vincent believed that the game's integrity required
Howe's expulsion from the sport, then the Commissioner's calculation
of the sport's best interests should have stood.
507. As stated by a previous arbitrator.
At its worst, to the extent that cocaine use becomes habitual or addictive, a
player risks both an increased chance of physical deterioration, and a dan-
gerous involvement with the criminals who sell the drug. That involvement
may lead to control of the player either because of the addiction or because
of the risk of exposure. The consequences of such control over any part of
the game are so obviously disastrous as to require no elaboration.
Weiler & Roberts, Sports and the Law, supra note 6, at 44 (quoting Arbitrator Rich-
ard Bloch's decision in the Willie Wilson arbitration).
508. See Howe Arbitration, supra note 480, ("The Commissioner seeks to justify his
exclusive reliance on institutional considerations by resting Howe's permanent expul-
sion on an obligation to deter repeated drug use by others."), reprinted in Weiler &
Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 9.
509. In his decision, Nicolau expressed his belief that "given continued education
and awareness at both the minor and Major League levels, this steady progress to-
ward a drug free environment is quite likely to continue." Id., reprinted in Weiler &
Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325. at 9. It seems highly unlikely that an
individual with little day-to-day exposure to the intricacies of MLB can make this
assessment.
510. Id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325, at 8.
511. Early in his career, Steve Howe recognized that baseball was insignificant in
relation to his drug addiction. After his one year suspension in 1984, Howe stated:
"It was the best thing that ever happened to me; I turned all my weaknesses into
strengths; without that year off, I couldn't have done it." Kuhn, supra note 75, at 310.
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As explained above, Nicolau closed his decision by concluding that
fairness to Steve Howe outweighed baseball's interest in deterring
drug use.51 Nicolau believed that "[w]hat was considered vital to
Howe's sobriety at this point in his life should have been imple-
mented. '513 Nicolau thus explicitly gives Howe's employer the re-
sponsibility of providing an atmosphere conducive to maintaining
"Howe's sobriety." '514 Employers, however, do not exist to remedy an
employee's drug addiction. As unfortunate as Howe's decade-long
addiction to drugs was, it is difficult to perceive that the tenets of fair-
ness would not allow an association to expel one of its members after
seven rule violations of the same character. Most certainly, seven
drug infractions constitutes just cause for a lifetime suspension from
MLB.
B. The Latrell Sprewell Arbitration
In 1992, the Golden State Warriors ("Warriors") selected Latrell
Sprewell, of the University of Alabama, in the NBA's amateur
draft.515 From 1992 to 1997, Sprewell achieved All-Star status during
three seasons.516 In 1997, the same year the Warriors players elected
Sprewell captain of the team, Warriors management hired Peter (P.J.)
Carlesimo as their new head coach. Before joining the Warriors, Car-
lesimo had coached at Seton Hall University and for the NBA's Port-
land Trailblazers.517
From the beginning of the 1997 season, the relationship between
Carlesimo and Sprewell rapidly deteriorated, leading to discussions of
trading Sprewell to another NBA club.518 On December 1, 1997, ap-
proximately one month into the NBA season, the Warriors engaged in
a three-man, two-ball drill at a practice in preparation for a game
against the Cleveland Cavaliers.51 9 As Sprewell participated in the
drill, Carlesimo approached him and requested that he use more
512. See supra note 500 and accompanying text.
513. Howe Arbitration, supra note 480, reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case
Supplement, supra note 325, at 9.
514. See id., reprinted in Weiler & Roberts, 1995 Case Supplement, supra note 325,
at 9.
515. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 74.
516. See id. at 15, 74.
517. See id. at 74.
518. See id. Coach Carlesimo has a reputation of being a screamer. See id. at 75
("Testimony was also given that screaming and profanity in general were not an infre-
quent occurrence."). Warriors Assistant Coach Mark Grabow, however, testified that
he "felt that [Carlesimo's] prodding of players was equally distributed among all the
players but because [Sprewell] was his star and he needed [Sprewell's] offense and
defensive energy" and that "he needed him more than any other player for [the War-
riors] to be successful." Id.
519. See id. at 76. The drill consisted of one rebounder, one passer, and one
shooter, who together worked to create as many shot opportunities as possible in a
fifty-five second period. See id.
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speed on his passes.5 20 Sprewell slammed the basketball on the
ground and eloquently asked Carlesimo to leave him alone.52' Car-
lesimo responded by ejecting Sprewell from the practice.5 2 Sprewell
immediately accosted Carlesimo, grabbing the coach's neck with both
hands.52 Sprewell's hand remained clenched around Carlesimo's
neck for between seven and ten seconds, while the agitated player told
his coach: "I will kill you." '5 24
After releasing Carlesimo's neck, Sprewell went to the Warriors'
locker room to shower before leaving the facility.51 In the locker
room, Sprewell knocked over a water cooler, showered, dressed, and
decided he wanted to confront Carlesimo again. 26 Leaving the locker
room, Sprewell re-entered the practice floor and approached Car-
lesimo.527 Several players and coaches tried to restrain Sprewell, but
only managed to enrage him further.52s Though the testimony as to
what occurred next was conflicting, an arbitrator would later find that
Sprewell threw at least one punch at Carlesimo that landed in "a graz-
ing manner on the Coach's right cheek." 9 After teammates and
coaches seperated Sprewell and Carlesimo, Sprewell left the practice
facility, visited with the Warrior's General Manager Garry St. Jean,
and demanded a trade.530
That evening, the Warriors announced they were suspending
Sprewell for a minimum of ten games and would review the situation
further to decide what action was appropriate. 3 After further inves-
tigation, the Warriors utilized provisions of the Uniform Player Con-
tract and the Warriors' Team Rules to terminate Sprewell's
contract.5 32 Meanwhile, the NBA league office launched an investiga-
520. See id
521. See id. ("The Grievant proceeded to slam the ball down and express a number
of expletives reasonably approximating 'get out of my face, get the fuck out of here
and leave me the fuck alone."').
522. See id. ("The Head Coach responded: 'you're the fuck out of here."').
523. See hi. at 76-77.
524. See id. (noting Sprewell's testimony that he used the words "I will kill you"
figuratively).
525. See id. at 77-78. Sprewell testified that as he was being led out of the gym, he
said "I'm gonna kill your ass" and "I hate you." Id. at 19.
526. See id at 19. (repeating Sprewell's testimony that he had enough of Car-
lesimo's "bullshit").
527. See hi. at 78.
528. See id. at 78-79.
529. See id. at 79. Sprewell testified that "he sought to free himself from those
grabbing him by kicking his feet and flailing his arms. He said it was possible that in
doing so, he may have hit the Head Coach in a flailing motion." Id. at 79. Others
testified that Sprewell freed his arms from the clutch of others and directed a punch at
Carlesimo that contacted his right cheek. See id.
530. See id. at 79-80.
531. See id. at 81.
532. See id. at 11-12. Section 16 of the Uniform Player Contract states: "The Team
may terminate this Contract... if the Player shall . . . at any time, fail, refuse, or
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tion of its own, interviewing twenty-one people on December 3.533
Based on the interviews, Commissioner David Stern suspended La-
trell Sprewell from the NBA for one year.5 34 Stern believed the sus-
pension was necessary to preserve the integrity of, and maintain the
public's confidence in, NBA basketball.535 Stern thought that a failure
to impose such a penalty "would denigrate that confidence. 5 36
On December 4, the day after the NBA announced its ban, Sprewell
and the NBPA filed grievances against the Warriors and the NBA con-
cerning their respective disciplinary actions.537 As agreed upon by the
NBA and the NBPA in the 1995 CBA, Arbitrator John Feerick would
hear the grievance.538 The hearing began on January 27, 1998 and
lasted over nine days.539 Ultimately, Arbitrator Feerick reinstated
Sprewell's contract with the Warriors and limited Commissioner
Stern's punishment to the 1997-1998 season (the equivalent of approx-
imately seven months).5 40
Feerick began his analysis by "emphasizing that violence in the
work place is not tolerated in the field of labor and employment
law."'541 Though Feerick strongly castigated Sprewell's conduct, he
noted that arbitrators must consider fairness in labor and employment
arbitrations.542 Thus, according to Feerick, the commissioner's pun-
ishment and the investigation leading to that punishment needed to be
"fundamentally fair."5 43 Feerick referred to the required fairness of
the investigation as "industrial due process," but noted that this term
was not held to the same standards as the Due Process Clause of the
neglect to conform his personal conduct to standards of good citizenship, good moral
character ... and good sportsmanship .... " Id. at 9.
The introduction to the Warriors' Team Rules held that "intentional violations of
significant rules will be considered a material breach of your individual contract and
could result in the termination of your player contract." Id. (emphasis omitted). The
rules contained a specific provision regarding violence and warned that "[tihe NBA
and your team will take immediate and appropriate action against any player who
engages in such [violent] conduct and all personnel are advised that violence must be
avoided at all times." Id. at 10.
533. See id. at 84.
534. See id. at 85. Stern considered imposing either a lifetime ban or a two-year
ban before settling on the one-year ban. See id. at 70.
535. See id.
536. Id.
537. See id. at 3.
538. See NBA CBA, supra note 22, Exhibit F, at F-15.
539. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 22, at 3 (naming John Feerick the NBA's
grievance arbitrator).
540. See id. at 100, 103.
541. Id. at 85.
542. See id.
543. Id. at 86. Arbitrator Feerick explained that "[t]he essential question for an
arbitrator is not whether disciplinary action was totally free from procedural error,
but rather whether the process was fundamentally fair." Id.
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United States Constitution.5" He found that the NBA's investigation
had been completed in good faith and was "fair and adequate under
the exigencies of the well-publicized situation with which it was then
confronted.""54 As to the Warriors' investigation, Feerick noted that
in an effort to maintain what team unity existed, the Warriors did not
question their own players as to the December 1 incident. 6 This lack
of questioning troubled Feerick, but he ultimately avoided ruling on
the matter, deeming that the Warriors' investigation and the NBA's
investigation "became, in reality, one after December 1, requiring
from a fairness standpoint that any disciplinary actions be treated
jointly and not as entirely separate events."" 7
Next, Arbitrator Feerick determined the standard of review he
would apply to the NBA's and the Warriors' discipline regarding
Sprewell. Feerick believed the Warriors' punishment, terminating
Sprewell's contract, was "plain" discipline under the league's CBA.11
He felt the Warriors' discipline was merely a severe reprimand for the
events that occurred on December 1, rather than a punishment for
disparaging the NBA's integrity. 49 The NBA's CBA demands that
for "plain" discipline the grievance arbitrator apply a just cause stan-
dard of review.5 50 Thus, as to the Warriors' discipline, the issue was
whether the Warriors had just cause to terminate Latrell Sprewell's
contract.
Arbitrator Feerick had more trouble deciding what standard of re-
view to apply to Commissioner Stern's one-year suspension of
Sprewell. Feerick found that Sprewell's conduct did, in fact, implicate
the integrity of, and public confidence in, the game of basketball.5 '
544. See id. at 86 ("Another aspect of fairness is the notion of industrial due pro-
cess. It is, however, a less exacting standard than its constitutional counterpart.").
545. Id- at 97.
546. See i&L at 98.
547. Id. at 99.
548. See id. at 93.
549. See id. at 92-93.
550. See id. at 93. Article XXXI, section 14(c) of the NBA CBA states: "The par-
ties recognize that a player may be subjected to disciplinary action for just cause by
his Team or by the Commissioner (or his designee). Therefore, in Grievances regard-
ing discipline, the issue to be resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for
the penalty imposed." NBA CBA, supra note 22, art. XXXI, § 14(c), at 173.
551. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 90 ("It is difficult to fashion a
bright-line rule for determining conduct that implicates the integrity of or public con-
fidence in the game of basketball. I find that such conduct would include, as in this
proceeding, a well-publicized violent subversion of the most fundamental authority
relationship in the game, that between player and coach."). The union argued that
the only issues which implicated the game's integrity were "gambling, acts affecting
the outcome of a game other than by its merits, and the use of performance-enhanc-
ing drugs." Id at 89-90. Feerick, however, determined the scope of the NBA Consti-
tution's integrity clause had to address more issues than those offered by the NBPA.
See id. at 90 ("The scope of Section 5(c), however, must be broader because gambling
is dealt with separately in the NBA Constitution, in Section 35(g), and penalties im-
posed by the Commissioner for such conduct are unappealable.").
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He found that "[a]n attack on a head coach puts in jeopardy the entire
structure and organization of a team, affecting its morale and the sport
at large. '552 Thus, according to Feerick, Stern's discipline was in no
way "plain." The NBA's CBA dictates that:
In any Grievance that involves an action taken by the Commis-
sioner (or his designee) concerning (i) the preservation of the integ-
rity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of
basketball, and (ii) a fine and/or suspension that results in a finan-
cial impact to the player of more than $25,000, the Grievance Arbi-
trator shall apply an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review.553
Feerick admitted that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard was ap-
plicable to this proceeding, but puzzlingly decided "that it should be
read together with the just cause standard of article XXXI, section
14(c), which provides that 'in grievances regarding discipline, the issue
to be resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for the pen-
alty imposed.' 55 4 Feerick provided no explanation as to why he de-
cided to mix the two standards.55
Applying the just cause standard to the Warriors' termination of
Sprewell's contract, Arbitrator Feerick noted that "[t]here has never
been a case of contract termination in the history of the NBA for a
physical assault . ,5.6 He also noted that never before had both a
team and the league imposed discipline for the same violent con-
duct.557 In the past, only the league had imposed discipline for acts of
violence. 8 Because of the dual punishment's severity, and the fact
that the NBA dominated the investigation, Arbitrator Feerick ruled
that the Warriors did not have just cause to terminate Latrell
Sprewell's contract.5 9
The arbitrator next turned to Stern's discipline. Feerick noted that
his "review of the Commissioner's discipline ... proved to be exceed-
ingly difficult, since he is entitled to great deference as the spokesper-
son for the sport of basketball in the National Basketball Association
and is accountable for the integrity of the League."'560 Feerick ex-
plained that because of this accountability, "it would be wrong for me
to substitute my judgment for his in terms of discipline. Such is not
552. Id. at 90.
553. NBA CBA, supra note 22, art. XXXI, § 5(c), at 167.
554. Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 92 (emphasis added by Arbitrator
Feerick).
555. See id. Feerick did, however, explain that "some arbitrators have linked arbi-
trary and capricious with just cause." Id.
556. Id. at 100.
557. See id.
558. See id.
559. See id. ("I am unable to sustain the termination of the Grievant's contract as
meeting a standard of just cause.").
560. Id. at 101.
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the role of a grievance arbitrator."56' In the decision's very next para-
graph, however, Feerick asserted that as an arbitrator, his judgment
had to be a factor. Feerick pondered whether his duty was to judge
Sprewell's action according to the evidence before the Commissioner
on December 3, or according to the evidence heard in the arbitration
proceedings conducted in the arbitrator's presence. 62 If he only re-
viewed the evidence before the Commissioner at the time of the disci-
pline, Feerick deemed that nine days of hearings, twenty-one
witnesses, and the documentary evidence would be a complete
waste.563 Feerick determined that "[i]n the end, [the NBA and the
NBPA have] asked that I establish the facts and determine whether
the penalties were appropriate. Having done so, they are entitled to
the judgment of the Grievance Arbitrator as to what has been estab-
lished by the evidence."5"
Arbitrator Feerick, concedingly substituting his judgment for the
Commissioner's, ruled that Sprewell's suspension would end after the
1997-1998 NBA season. Though Feerick condemned Sprewell's con-
duct, he noted that the doctrines of fairness must temper the commis-
sioner-imposed discipline. 65 Feerick also believed that public
confidence in the game of basketball "is dependent not only on appro-
priate punishment for misconduct but also on the fairness of proceed-
ings where that punishment is reviewed." 56 Finding the loss of sixty-
eight games and $6.4 million commensurate with Sprewell's miscon-
duct,5 67 Feerick believed that principles of justice and fairness re-
quired that Sprewell start the next season with this "tragic event
behind him. '568
The most troubling aspect of Feerick's analysis in the Latrell
Sprewell arbitration surrounds his examination of the applicable stan-
dard of review as to the Commissioner's discipline. As discussed
above, when commissioner action is taken to preserve the integrity of,
or maintain the confidence in, the game of basketball, the arbitrator
must apply an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.569 The
NBA CBA, however, also states that "in Grievances regarding disci-
561. Id at 101 n.13 (explaining that an arbitrator does not "sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice" (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))).
562. See id. at 101-02.
563. See id. at 102.
564. Id. (emphasis added).
565. See id at 103.
566. Id
567. See id at 104 ("A suspension of practically an entire season is one of great
severity, to be sure, but appropriate given the fact that physical altercations with a
head coach strike at the very core of a structure that provides stability for a team and
an organized sport.").
568. Id at 103. Little did Feerick know, however, that Sprewell would feel the
effects of a one-year suspension because of the NBA's 1998-1999 labor stoppage.
569. See NBA CBA, supra note 22, art. XXXI, § 5(c), at 167.
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pline, the issue to be resolved shall be whether there has been just
cause for the penalty imposed."57 It is not clear how, if at all, an
arbitrator should read these two provisions together. An arbitrator
could easily consider Stem's one-year suspension of Sprewell both an
action to preserve the game's integrity and a normal disciplinary ac-
tion. Thus, an arbitrator could select either standard of review or, the-
oretically, mix the two together. Though he offered no explanation,
Feerick chose to combine the two standards to analyze the Commis-
sioner's discipline.
Arbitrator Feerick, however, clearly drew a line between "plain"
discipline, which required the just cause standard, and integrity-impli-
cating discipline, which required the arbitrary and capricious standard.
As explained above, Feerick held that the Warriors' termination of
Sprewell's contract "was done to punish [the] Grievant for what he
had done on December 1" and thus was "plain" discipline.57 Feerick
then determined that "[s]ince the disciplinary nature of this action is
plain, a just cause standard of review ... is applicable. '572 On the
other hand, Feerick ruled that Sprewell's conduct indeed implicated
basketball's integrity, which would permit the commissioner or his
designee to impose discipline that the CBA explicitly states is subject
to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.573 In labeling only
the Warriors' discipline as "plain," Feerick should have recognized
that his own characterizations dictated the application of different
standards of review for the team's and the commissioner's discipline.
Thus, as to the Commissioner's one-year suspension of Latrell
Sprewell, the issue should have been simply whether David Stern's
punishment was arbitrary and capricious. In drafting the CBA, the
NBA and NBPA acknowledged this deference which commissioners
must receive to protect the league's integrity. By seemingly ignoring
the arbitrary and capricious standard, Arbitrator Feerick neglected
this CBA-imposed deference and applied a lower standard of review
Using this hybrid standard of review, Feerick evaluated Stern's dis-
cipline. Though Supreme Court precedent ordered that arbitrators
should not "sit to dispense [their] own brand of industrial justice," '574
Feerick acknowledged that the proceedings before him required the
use of his own judgment to review the commissioner's discipline. 5
Feerick, however, cut the suspension from twelve months to approxi-
mately seven, but never explicitly asked or decided whether Stern had
either just cause to impose the punishment or, more pertinently,
570. Id., art. XXXI, § 14(c), at 173.
571. Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 93 (emphasis added).
572. Id.
573. See supra notes 551-52 and accompanying text.
574. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
575. See supra notes 560-64 and accompanying text.
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whether the Commissioner acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Even utilizing the less deferential standard of review, Feerick deter-
mined that Sprewell's violent conduct, which admittedly struck "at the
very core of [the NBA's] structure," would not be just cause for a
twelve month suspension, but would be for a seven month ban.
Feerick did note that if he merely reviewed the evidence before
Commissioner Stern when Stern imposed the punishment, then the
arbitration decision would have upheld the commissioner's discipline
in fu.5 76 In doing so, Feerick seemed to admit that Stern would at
least have had just cause for imposing the one-year suspension when
he did so on December 3. At some point within the arbitration award,
however, it seems that Feerick decided that rather than examine the
Commissioner's discipline under any standard of review, he would
simply impose the punishment that he believed was just. Again, quot-
ing Arbitrator Feerick, "[s]uch is not the role of a grievance
arbitrator.",51
The Howe and Sprewell Arbitrations provide ample evidence that
arbitrators, though not bound by the judiciary's deference to commis-
sioner discipline, blatantly choose to substitute their judgment as to
what is best for professional sports for the commissioner's judgment.
Arbitrators disregard applicable standards upon which to review com-
missioner disciplinary decisions and merely impose the punishments
which they view as fair. Such may be permissible if arbitrators were
either granted de novo review of a commissioner's decision or had the
power to impose the original punishment rather than the commis-
sioner himself. Collective bargaining agreements, however, ask arbi-
trators to review discipline, not to impose it. Indisputably, arbitrators
can ignore the judiciary's deference to commissioner disciplinary deci-
sions. For arbitration to function as a viable means of resolving a dis-
pute, however, the arbitrator must pay heed to the demands and
provisions of CBAs.
In ignoring bargained-for standards of review, Arbitrators Nicolau
and Feerick neglected their duties "to 'reach a fair solution of a prob-
lem' within the letter and spirit of the collective bargaining agree-
ment[s]." 578 This neglect of arbitral duty begs for a solution that
would eliminate an arbitrator's ability to determine the best interests
of a professional sports league. As discussed below in part IV, arbi-
trator neglect, among other things, should prompt MLB and the NBA
576. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 101-02
("I considered whether I should apply to the Commissioner's decision a level
of review that asked and answered whether the NBA ... rendered a fair and
reasonable judgment based on what was before it as a result of [their] inves-
tigation. Applying such a standard, I would sustain the decision of a one-
year suspension of the Grievant.").
577. Id. at 101.
578. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 365 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597.).
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to eliminate grievance arbitration proceedings, and transfer all disci-
plinary authority to the commissioner, under their CBAs.
IV. COMMISSIONERS NEED UNAPPEALABLE DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF
THEIR SPORTS
This part argues that commissioners must maintain the sole author-
ity to discipline integrity-implicating misconduct without fear of exter-
nal review. To best protect their integrity, professional baseball and
basketball must follow the lead of the NFL and endow only one per-
son with the authority to decide what is best for his sport. CBAs
should grant neither arbitrators nor judges the authority to review
commissioners' best interests disciplinary decisions. Commissioners,
hired for the purposes of protecting and advancing the best interests
of their leagues, must have sole control over league discipline.
A. Grievance Arbitration Fails in Professional Sports
As discussed in part III, the Supreme Court ruled in United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.579 that "an arbi-
trator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice."580 Indeed, Arbitrator Feerick recognized this dic-
tate in the Latrell Sprewell arbitration stating that it "is not the role of
a grievance arbitrator ... to substitute my judgment for [the commis-
sioner's judgment] in terms of discipline." '581 Despite this recognition,
however, Feerick admitted that his judgment had to play a key role in
the disposition of the Sprewell grievance. 2
Herein lies the problem with grievance arbitration in the world of
professional sports. Though arbitrators are not supposed to substitute
their judgment for the commissioner's, they nonetheless must. To
avoid this substitution would be an impossible task. How can anyone
reviewing the decision of another not impose his views upon the par-
ties before him? When courts have reviewed commissioner discipli-
nary decisions, the primary issue has been whether the commissioner
had the authority to impose the discipline. 83 Courts can simply look
to the league's operating agreement to obtain a fairly objective answer
579. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
580. Id. at 597. According to the Court, the arbitrator "may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
581. Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 101.
582. See supra notes 562-64 and accompanying text.
583. See, e.g., Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Basic to the under-
lying suit brought by Oakland and to this appeal is whether the Commissioner of
baseball is vested by contract with the authority to disapprove player assignments
which he finds to be 'not in the best interests of baseball."').
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as to the extent of the commissioner's authority. In grievance arbitra-
tions regarding discipline, however, the primary issue inevitably is
whether the commissioner-imposed punishment is appropriate.5"
The arbitrator merely asks himself what punishment he believes is fair
and rules accordingly. If the arbitrator were to uphold the commis-
sioner's discipline in full, he would do so because, in his judgment, the
commissioner's discipline was fair. Though the arbitrator would not
replace the commissioner's judgment in this scenario, the arbitrator's
judgment would still be dispositive in the matter. In situations where
the arbitrator decreases a grievant's punishment, he is naturally sub-
stituting his judgment as to the fairness of the discipline for the com-
missioner's. In the Sprewell arbitration, Arbitrator Feerick admitted
as such: "In the end, [the parties] asked that I establish the facts and
determine whether the penalties were appropriate. Having done so,
they are entitled to the judgment of the Grievance Arbitrator as to
what has been established by the evidence."" - So, although imposing
one's sense of "industrial justice" may not be the role of grievance
arbitrators, this imposition has inevitably become commonplace in
professional sports.586
The potential for arbitrators to impose their judgment as to what is
best for a sports league is at complete odds with the duties of the
commissioner. When Judge Landis became the inaugural sports com-
missioner, he did so with "control over whatever and whoever had to
do with baseball." 5" This control allowed Landis and the commis-
sioners who followed him to exercise their personal judgment to de-
cide what was best for their leagues. Commissioners examine the
intricacies and minutiae of their sports league on a continual basis to
determine what actions would maintain the league's best interests. As
an alternative method of dispute resolution, arbitration gives this best
interests authority to individuals who could not possibly determine
what is best for a sports league. Arbitration is most effective as a
means of resolving disputes of first impression. Arbitration should
not serve as an appellate tribunal for decisions made in the best inter-
ests of an industry. By insisting on grievance arbitration for integrity-
implicating discipline, the MLBPA and the NBPA have effectively
eliminated the primary purpose of the commissioner's office: Com-
584. See, eg., Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 20, at 7 ("While the parties have
presented many issues for resolution, the essential issues are whether the one-year
suspension of the Grievant by the NBA and the termination of his Player Contract by
the Warriors are appropriate.").
585. Id. at 102.
586. An arbitrator's ability to ignore judicial precedent exacerbates his tendency to
impose his personal judgment. Unbounded by substantive law, the arbitrator is free
to ignore perfectly valid legal arguments. See Kuhn, supra note 75, at 156 ("Remem-
ber that an arbitrator has enough leeway to virtually ignore your strong legal
arguments.").
587. Finley, 569 F.2d at 532.
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missioners, not arbitrators, are responsible for protecting the integrity
of sports leagues and, thus, should receive the sole power to deter-
mine that league's best interests.
In this respect, it is also vital for sports leagues to prohibit litigation
regarding a commissioner's best interests disciplinary decisions. For
the same reasons that arbitrators are not qualified to determine a
league's best interests, neither should judges have the opportunity to
make decisions that could impact on a sports league's integrity.
Though judges have displayed considerable deference to commis-
sioner disciplinary decisions in the past, the most recent litigation in-
volving commissioner discipline shows the danger that can accompany
judicial review of commissioner authority.
When Pete Rose sued Commissioner Bart Giamatti in Ohio state
court, the locally-elected state judge enjoined baseball's commissioner
from presiding over a hearing regarding team sports' greatest sin-
gambling on games in which one participates.588 In doing so, this
judge succeeded in "insinuating himself.., into baseball's disciplinary
procedures [rendering] the commissioner's core function-disci-
pline-. . . permanently problematic." '589 Fortunately for MLB, a fed-
eral court relieved the Ohio state court of its jurisdiction to
adjudicate the matter. 9 ° Pete Rose, however, came very close to giv-
ing the judiciary the authority to determine MLB's best interests. As
one commentator observed:
Yet another functioning American institution-the commissioner's
office-almost became a victim of judicial overreaching. Today's
courts have an unhealthy itch to supervise and fine-tune virtually
every equity judgment in American life. Rose's legal strategy was
to find a judge willing to insinuate himself into baseball's discipli-
nary procedures. If Rose had succeeded, the commissioner's office
would have been irreperably damaged. Its core function, which is
disciplinary, would permanently have been put in question. An-
other of civil society's intermediary institutions-those that stand
between the individual and the state-would have been broken to
the saddle of government. A nannylike judiciary would henceforth
have made the commissioner's office negligible-another hitherto
private institution permeated by state power.591
Thus, despite judicial deference, the risk that judges, like arbitrators,
could impose their personal judgment onto a professional sports
league is too great for sports leagues to allow access to the courts.592
588. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
589. Will, supra note 2, at 125.
590. See supra notes 270-79 and accompanying text.
591. Will, supra note 2, at 201.
592. See id. at 138 ("Courts traditionally have been wary about intervening in the
internal governance of private associations, but in the current climate of judicial
hubris, a judge can almost always be found who will try to fine-tune any contro-
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Sports leagues created their commissioner's offices to endow an in-
dividual with the authority to determine what actions and reactions
were necessary to protect the integrity of, and the public's confidence
in, that professional sports league. This duty requires the use of indi-
vidual judgment to ascertain the best interests of a league. The parties
to the NBA and MLB collective bargaining agreements must realize
that to best maintain their league's integrity, only their commissioner
should exercise and impose this judgment. Outsiders must not receive
this authority. Unions, however, have little incentive to voluntarily
concede the unilateral authority to impose integrity-implicating disci-
pline to an individual they conceive as being a biased representative of
management.
B. Unions Must Trust that Commissioners Will Impose
Just Discipline
The National Labor Relations Act dictates that employers and their
employees' union must collectively bargain "in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 593
A procedure to settle employee grievances is certainly a term or con-
dition of employment.5 94 Thus, the owners of a professional sports
league cannot unilaterally install a grievance procedure that they
alone find suitable. To establish a procedure that involves only the
commissioner's unappealable judgment, the NBA and MLB must con-
vince their unions, through collective bargaining, to accept this new
system.
Unions must understand that commissioners act to ensure the
league's best interests, and not just management's best interests. Play-
ers unions have rarely, if ever, concerned themselves with the best
interests of their sports leagues.595 These unions primarily exist to
maximize the amount owners distribute on pay day.596 While unions
are properly concerned with the rights and welfare of their members,
versy."); see also i. at 124 ("America's judiciary has an awful itch to bring every facet
of life under its supervision.").
593. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
594. See NLRB v. Independent Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1979) ("A
grievance-arbitration procedure is a term or condition of employment and a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of [the National Labor Relations
Act].").
595. See, e.g., Will, supra note 2, at 223 ("[Baseball's] union has rarely recognized
any responsibility to baseball beyond maximizing players' earnings."). Discussing
Marvin Miller, the former head of the MLBPA, Will stated:
Miller's thinking about baseball's collective health as an industry is primi-
five. When he goes beyond reiteration of the fact that revenues are rolling
in, he simply assumes that the union exists to get as much of the money as
possible for the players, right now, and that baseball will prosper because it
has been prospering.
Id. at 205.
596. See, e.g., id. at 206 (describing Marvin Miller as a "single-minded salary-maxi-
mizer... [who] is not used to thinking about the future of baseball as an industry").
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they must realize that if a league loses either its integrity or the pub-
lic's confidence, players' rights will mean little. Unions must recog-
nize that conduct that strikes at a league's integrity does not only
damage the league office-it damages the game as an institution.
With that damage to the game, unions and the players they represent
will most certainly suffer.5 97 Though this point may seem basic, it
must be realized and acted upon for professional sports to survive.
Also damaging to a league's integrity are the length and substance
of the proceedings that accompany arbitrations and litigation. The
Sprewell arbitration occurred in the middle of the NBA season.
Rather than focusing attention on the outcomes of league games, most
NBA fans faced the deluge of news coverage surrounding Sprewell's
grievance;598 pictures of Coach Carlesimo's bruised and scratched
neck appeared on television daily. The Sprewell event itself was dam-
aging enough to the NBA's integrity, even without the constant re-
minder of its occurrence. In the NFL, where the commissioner has
the final word on discipline, controversies regarding discipline fre-
quently become a non-issue by the next week's games. By keeping its
disciplinary grievance procedure in-house, the NFL can control and
limit the damage which any misconduct may create.
From the creation of the commissioners' office, league operating
agreements have charged commissioners with the responsibility of
protecting the league's best interests. Unions must look past who
hires the commissioner, however, and understand that commissioners,
in most cases, do not focus their attention on pleasing ownership.599 If
unions maintain the narrow view that commissioners ignore player in-
terests and welfare, then the integrity of sports leagues will decline as
597. See Mike Lupica, Mad As Hell: How Sports Got Away from the Fans and
How We Get It Back 130-31 (1996). In discussing the increase in criminal activity
among professional athletes, Lupica tells the story of Michael Irvin, a star wide re-
ceiver for the NFL's Dallas Cowboys. In 1995, after being arrested with two topless
dancers at a Dallas Hotel, Irvin pleaded no contest to a felony charge of drug posses-
sion. See id. at 114, 117. Though married, Irvin wanted to celebrate his thirtieth birth-
day with the dancers, a teammate, two ounces of cocaine, and three ounces of
marijuana. See id. at 114. Though Lupica describes Irvin's punishment as a "slap on
the wrists," he states that "[ulnions in sports are always screaming about the players'
rights in cases like these." Id. at 130-31. Lupica, however, explains that one day,
"[tihe unions should understand something sports fans understood long ago, as the
crime docket kept getting longer and longer on the sports page: Every time someone
like Irvin makes this kind of spectacle of himself he damages others in the union the
way he damages everything else." Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
598. Arbitration and litigation also force players to divide loyalties and testify
either against their team, the league, or a teammate. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra
note 20, at 3-4 (listing four members of the Golden State Warriors who testified
against the Warriors and the league).
599. See generally Harris, supra note 16, at 647 ("You are hired by the owners, but
you are called upon to make decisions that affect them. You can't please everyone,
every time.... You simply have to do what you think in your judgment is in the best
interest of the game." (quoting Commissioner Pete Rozelle)).
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the commissioners' best interests judgments continue to face a barrage
of second-guessing.
C. Commissioners Should Have a Limited Role in
Labor Negotiations
Players unions regard commissioners "as an extension of the mul-
tiemployer bargaining unit ... and a servant of that group." 60 Thus,
unions will always be slow to give commissioners additional authority
to make unilateral decisions that will have an impact on the union
constituency. The primary and obvious source of this union sentiment
derives from the fact that team owners hire the commissioner without
input from the union. What exacerbates this sentiment in MLB and
the NBA is the commissioner's involvement in labor negotiations. In
both these leagues, the commissioner is management's primary collec-
tive bargaining representative.6 1 Regarding the commissioner as the
primary caretaker of management's interests, the MLBPA and the
NBPA have little incentive to believe that their league's commission-
ers will ever protect a player's rights in the face of management
opposition.
The NFL provides a functional model to dampen players unions'
anti-commissioner predilection. The NFL commissioner does not
handle the owners' day-to-day labor negotiations; rather, the NFL cre-
ated the National Football League Management Council, "which is
recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of pres-
ent and future employer member Clubs of the National Football
League."60 2 By creating a separate entity to negotiate for manage-
ment, the NFL de-emphasized (somewhat) the commissioner's ties to
the NFL's team owners. The MLB and the NBA should adopt a via-
ble management council of sorts to relieve the commissioner of his
collective bargaining duties. If the MLBPA and NBPA see their
leagues making an effort to decrease their commissioners' alleged
management bias, they may be more apt to agree to a system where
the commissioner maintains unappealable disciplinary authority. 603
600. Helyar, supra note 6, at 37 (quoting MLB negotiator John Gaherin).
601. See generally, e.g., NBA CBA, supra note 22, Exhibit I (listing side letters to
the CBA signed by the Acting Executive Director of the NBPA and the NBA's
commissioner).
602. NFL CBA, supra note 24, pmbl., at 1.
603. David Stem's thorough involvement in the 1998-1999 NBA lockout may pre-
vent the possibility that the NBPA or its constituency will ever see him, in particular,
as anything but management's representative. See Phil Taylor, To the Victor Belongs
the Spoils, Sports Illustrated, Jan. 18, 1999, at 48, 51 ("Ultimately, the biggest sacrifice
Stem may have made involved his image. During the dispute he got his hands dirtier
than he normally does, playing hardball out in the open, and he can no longer take
pride in the NBA's never having lost a game because of labor strife."). After the
NBA and NBPA reached a settlement, Stern made a "no-hard-feelings" speech to the
union membership. See id. Though Stem exited the speech to a round of applause, a
handful of players walked out before the Commissioner began to talk. See id.
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As to discipline, however, commissioners do not actually exhibit a
management bias. Latrell Sprewell's one-year suspension for striking
his coach and Steve Howe's banishment for life from baseball were
neither victories for management nor losses for the union. Most cer-
tainly, the union member who commits the discipline-warranting mis-
conduct will certainly feel the wrath of the management-hired
commissioner. But commissioners make these disciplinary decisions
for the welfare of the league, not to impose management's will on
subordinate players. Though it may be easier for sports unions to be-
lieve this argument if commissioners did not engage in collective bar-
gaining, the union should nonetheless forfeit grievance arbitration of
integrity-implicating matters for the league's, and thus the players',
best interests.
CONCLUSION
In 1921, the team owners in Major League Baseball believed that to
restore and maintain baseball's integrity in the wake of the Black Sox
Scandal, one person had to guide the league and oversee its interests.
That person received the title "Commissioner," and since that time
each major professional sports league has chosen to appoint a com-
missioner to ensure "the integrity of, and public confidence in," its
sport. Originally, commissioners had complete, unquestioned control
over all disciplinary issues their leagues faced. As sports labor unions
grew in strength, however, commissioners increasingly found their dis-
ciplinary decisions publicly challenged.
Throughout the last seventy years, the judiciary has displayed sub-
stantial deference toward the decisions of sports commissioners re-
garding issues that implicate the best interests of their sports leagues.
Despite the judiciary's tendency to defer to commissioners, arbitrators
have eschewed this deference in proceedings regarding commissioner-
imposed discipline, replacing commissioners' judgment with their
own. In professional football, the National Football League Players
Association cannot challenge commissioner-imposed discipline in any
external tribunal: the commissioner's word as to discipline is final. In
MLB and the NBA, however, arbitrators receive the authority to re-
view commissioner-imposed discipline, even when that discipline re-
gards the integrity of the sport. Because arbitrators and judges have
the power to disregard a commissioner's judgment in MLB and the
NBA, these leagues and their unions must collectively bargain to elim-
inate arbitral grievance procedures from their respective CBAs. Only
by removing external review of disciplinary actions can commissioners
optimally preserve their league's integrity.
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